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Abstract
Essays on The Economics of Health Care Payment Reforms
Thi Hai Yen Tran
2021
Both public and private health care sectors in the United States have been experimenting with
many innovative payment methods with the aim of improving quality of care while containing the cost
growth. For example, large employers and insurers in private sector innovated their insurance design
to encourage patients to make better decisions regarding to treatments and health care providers.
In public sector, Medicare recently implemented reforms on payments to physicians, hospitals and
other health care facilities that incorporated quality-based bonuses. It also implemented policies
such as site-neutral payment policies for dierent kinds of facilities that provide similar services
in order to reduce unnecessary spending. In this thesis, I evaluate the impacts of some of such
payment reforms on patients' choice, quality of care, and healthcare spending. I also examine the
relative importance of dierent components of health care policies, e.g., nancial incentives versus
quality and cost information provision. Finally, combining data with theory I predict the eects of
a Medicare's site-neutral payment policy and propose the optimal reimbursement and insurance
policies for the outpatient care services.
Policy makers in the US are increasingly tying payments for health care providers to their quality
measures, although there is mixed empirical evidence on the performance of the current program.
In the rst chapter, I evaluate the impact on hospital quality of Medicare's Hospital Value-Based
Purchasing program, a large federal program which rewards hospital for quality of their service. I
exploit the introduction of the incentive and the variations in incentives payment across hospitals
to identify the program's eects on hospital quality. I nd that, compared to non-participating
hospitals, participating hospitals on average improve on more than half of the patient experience
outcomes after the program started. However, the magnitude of the improvement is rather small.
There is no signicant improvement in mortality rates. I also nd that there exists some convergence
in quality of the participating hospitals. That is, hospitals that expect lower value-based incentive
payment in the future improve quality more than hospitals that expect more payment in the future.
In the second chapter, I examine the relative importance of nancial incentive and quality
and cost information in changing healthcare consumer's facility choices. I do so by exploiting
the Reference Pricing (RP) program implemented by the California Public Employee's Retirement
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System, which increased cost-sharing at expensive health care providers and provided enrollees with
a clear comparison of quality between high-cost and low-cost providers. I nd that the program
led to a 30.4% increase in the probability of a patient choosing low-cost ambulatory surgery centers
(ASCs) when in need of a procedure covered by the RP. The program also led to a 22.6% increase in
the probability of a patient choosing ASCs when in need of a procedure related to RP procedures but
not directly impacted by the RP nancially. The presence of the large spillover eect suggests the
importance of the information the RP provided patients with. Furthermore, the demand estimation
pre-RP and post-RP shows that patients with RP procedures are more sensitive to price and less
sensitive to distance and their health risk after the RP. Their perception of HOPDs' quality drops
signicantly while that of ASCs' quality stays the same. I estimate that the nancial incentive
change in the RP program explains about 15% of the total demand change, while the change in
patient's perception of facility quality explains about 70%.
In the nal chapter, I study how Medicare can achieve greater eciency by jointly optimizing
its reimbursement structure and insurance design for the outpatient services performed in hospital
outpatient departments and ambulatory surgery centers. Using large datasets on Medicare claims
and providers' nancials, I nd that current Medicare reimbursement rates are signicantly above
marginal costs for both HOPDs and ASCs, and that ASCs oer equal or higher net value than
HOPDs for common outpatient procedure groups. I develop a theoretical model to characterize the
optimal reimbursement rates and coinsurance rates. I demonstrate that reimbursement rates should
be set at providers' marginal costs, and that coinsurance rates should be higher for HOPDs than
for ASCs. Counterfactual analyses show that moving from current practice to the proposed optimal
policy would reduce Medicare spending by 15% to 23%, while simultaneously increasing the social
surplus by 3.1% to 6.4%. In contrast, if coinsurance rates are constrained to be the same across
provider types, as in the current Medicare insurance policy, more limited welfare improvements are
still possible by increasing reimbursements rates for HOPDs to incentivize greater sorting into ASCs.
Under such scenarios, I estimate an increase in social surplus of 3.1% to 6.1% and Medicare savings
of 9% to 15% instead. Lastly, I show that Medicare's recent policy change, which decreased HOPDs'
reimbursement rates to ASCs' rates while keeping the coinsurance rates the same, resulted in social
surplus reduction.
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Chapter 1
Eects of Medicare's Hospital Value
Based Purchasing on quality of
hospitals in the United States
1.1 Introduction
Healthcare in the United States is extremely costly, and healthcare spending continues to rise in the
recent years. Research on the correlation between costs and quality nds that the correlation between
them is either nil or negative (Yasaitis et al., 2009; Jha et al., 2009; Hussey et al., 2013). Quality
performance also varies widely across hospitals. For example, Jha et al. (2005) document that
performance varies moderately among large hospital-referral regions, with the top-ranked regions
scoring 12 percentage points (for acute myocardial infarction) to 23 percentage points (for pneumo-
nia) higher than the bottom-ranked regions. The absence of positive correlation between quality
and costs and the variation in quality suggests that there is large room for quality improvement.
Numerous public and private payer initiatives in the US have attempted to resolve this lack
of positive return of healthcare spending through value-based purchasing programs. Indeed, the
U.S Patient Protection and Aordable Care Act of 2010, also known as the ACA, prioritizes
improvements in the healthcare delivery infrastructure, healthcare quality, and containment of
healthcare costs. Central to this Act is performance-based payment models and care delivery
models that shift from a traditional fee-for-service model to a greater focus on increased quality
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and accountability with an emphasis on evaluating, reporting, rewarding excellence, and penalizing
poor health care delivery.
Hospital Value-Based Purchasing program (HVBP) is a value-based payment program estab-
lished by ACA for Medicare hospitals and Medicare patients. It is one of the largest and most
comprehensive Medicare's pay-for-performance programs that aects more than 3000 hospitals in
the US and targets a wide range of quality measures. Beginning in scal year (FY) 2013, HVBP
makes Medicare payments to acute care hospitals - hospitals paid under the Inpatient Prospective
Payment System (IPPS) - conditional on performance as assessed by a variety of metrics. Starting
with clinical process and patient experience measures in scal year (FY) 2013, the program expands
to include clinical outcome measures in FY 2014 and Medicare spending measures in FY 2015.
HVBP is budget neutral, redistributing hospitals payment withholds from losing to winning
hospitals that equals to 1% of hospital payments from the existing IPPS. The size of the program
incentives also increases gradually from 1% of diagnosis-related group revenue in FY 2013 to 2% by
FY 2017.
In this paper, I measure HVBP's impacts on a variety of hospitals' performance measures, in-
cluding mortality rates and patient experience measures. First, I conduct a Dierence-in-Dierences
analysis, comparing HVBP participating hospitals with HVBP non-participating hospitals before
and after the program was launched in order to estimate the extensive margin of HVBP's eects
on hospital quality. This kind of analysis for HVBP has been done before by Ryan et al. (2017)
and Ryan et al. (2015). However, unlike their paper, I do not aggregate individual quality measures
to a composite score for each quality domain. Instead, I use raw individual quality measures in
order to examine if there is heterogeneity in responses of dierent quality measures to HVBP. By
not aggregating measures within a domain of quality into a single composite index, I also preserve
data variations that are needed to estimate the DID regression precisely. Moreover, although the
performance score calculated by Medicare for HVBP payment is available during the post-HVBP
implementation period for only HVBP participating hospitals, the raw quality measures are available
for all hospitals participating and not participating in HVBP. Therefore, unlike Ryan et al. (2015),
I do not have to impute quality performance for the non-participating hospitals.
I also conduct an instrumental variables (IV) analysis of the intensive margin of HVBP on
participating hospitals. While the DID analysis mentioned above tells us whether the program
works, the IV analysis will tell how much HVBP participating hospitals respond to the program
payment generosity. The latter information is crucial to the design of the optimal HVBP program.
The IV regression regresses a range of quality measures on the expected incentive payment that
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hospitals expect to receive in two periods time. This time lag of two years is due to the design
of HVBP in which payment adjustment made in year t + 2 depends on how hospitals perform in
year t. The challenge of this estimation is to construct the expected incentive payment. Under
some assumptions, I construct an empirical analog of hospitals' expected incentive payment using
hospital past year quality performance. Because of the mean reversion problem that is associated
with the use of past year quality measures to predict the expected incentive payment, I propose to
instrument for this variable by using predicted incentive generated from historical quality data. In
the regression, the time period of the historical data is 2008 and the time period of the regression
is 2012-2015. The idea of this instrument is that quality of a hospital is a stable process, so the
predicted incentive generated using the raw quality measures in 2008 is correlated with quality and
incentive payment in the years under HVBP. This correlation justies the relevancy of the proposed
instrument. Under the assumption that stochastic errors in quality process is serially uncorrelated,
after controlling for hospital xed eects and hospital observable characteristics, quality measures
in 2008 should not be correlated with the stochastic errors in quality measures from 2012 onwards.
This justies the exogeneity assumption of the proposed instrument.
Third, the DID analysis and the IV analysis are complemented with the summary statistics that
sheds light on the distributional eects of HVBP. This is an important aspect of the program to be
evaluated because HVBP does not aim at only improving the average level of quality of hospitals
across the U.S but also reducing the gaps in quality and costs across regions. It is also not sucient
to just examine the eects of HVBP on average hospital quality because for example, if hospitals do
not improve quality signicantly after HVBP, HVBP's eect might be purely re-distributional and
the direction of this redistribution might or might not be desirable.
This article is related to a literature of small growing literature that studies pay-for-performance
models in health care market. Ryan et al. (2015) and Ryan et al. (2017) are the rst two papers
that study this particular program, but as mentioned above they have some certain limitations with
a way of implementing the Dierence-in-Dierences Analysis. Moreover, they and other papers that
study other pay-for-performance programs focus mostly on the extensive margin of the program
(see for example, Grossbart (2006), Lindenauer et al. (2007), Ryan (2009), Jha et al. (2012)). This
paper extends the literature by analyzing the intensive margin of this particular program, and its
distributional eects across the participating hospitals.
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1.2 Institutional background
The Medicare's Hospital Valued-Based Purchasing Program 1 rewards acute care hospitals with
incentive payments for the quality of care they give to people with Medicare. This program adjusts
payment to hospitals under the Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) based on the quality
of care they deliver. Under the IPPS before HVBP, Medicare payment is made to hospitals based
on a predetermined, xed amount. The payment amount for a particular service is derived based on
the classication system of that service (for example, diagnosis-related groups for inpatient hospital
services). The common critique of this Fee for Service (FFS) payment approach is that it induces
over-utilization of medical treatments but does not encourage quality improvement. HVBP aims to
x that problem by tying payment to quality. Specically, it aims to improve the quality and safety
of acute inpatient care for Medicare beneciaries and all patients by several ways, such as eliminating
or reducing adverse events (healthcare errors resulting in patient harm), adopting evidence-based
care standards and protocols that make the best outcomes for the most patients, changing hospital
processes to make patients' care experiences better, etc.
Participating hospitals in HBVP are all U.S hospitals that are paid by Inpatient Prospective
Payment System, i.e, Acute Care hospitals. Hospitals that are not paid prospectively - including
Critical Access hospitals - are not eligible for HVBP. Exploiting this policy design, the DID analysis
in subsection 1.3.2 take Acute Care hospitals as the treatment group and Critical Access hospitals
as the control group.
HVBP withholds participating hospitals' Medicare payments by a percentage specied by law
(1% when it was launched in 2013 and 2% since 2017) and uses the estimated total amount of
those reductions to fund value-based incentive payments to hospitals based on their performance
in the program. The program then applies the net result of the reduction and the incentive as a
claim-by-claim Adjustment Factor to the base payment amount for Medicare FFS claims in the scal
associated with the performance period. That is the net HVBP incentive payment for hospital h at
time t is given by:
Net incentive paymentht ($)
= Adj Factorht × FFSht
= (1 + Incentive percentageht −Withhold percentaget)× FFSht
= (1 +At × Total Performance Scoreht −Withhold percentaget)× FFSht
1http://www.qualitynet.org/dcs/ContentServer?c=Page&pagename=QnetPublic%2FPage%2FQnetTier2&cid=1228772039937
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Domain Measure Names 2013 2014 2015 2016
Patient
Experience
Nurse Communication x x x x
Doctor Communication x x x x
Medicine Communication x x x x
Discharge Information x x x x
Stas' Responsiveness x x x x
Hospital Cleanliness x x x x




Heart Attack Mortality Rate x x x x
Heart Failure Mortality Rate x x x x
Pneumonia Mortality Rate x x x x
Table 1.1: List of quality measures included in HVBP program in 2013 - 2017
Incentive percentage is a linear exchange function of Total Performance Score, i.e., Medicare's
aggregate score of hospital quality measures. The slope of this function A is common for all hospitals
and can vary over time such that at each and every scal year the sum of incentive payment over
all hospitals is equal to the sum of withhold amount of all hospitals.
Total Performance Score can be thought of as Medicare's aggregate measure of hopitals' many
quality dimensions, such as mortality, patient safety, patient experience, spending, etc. Table 1
presents an example of a set of measures used to calculate hospital's Total Performance Score and
their data availability for years after HVBP was launched. The full set of measures are included in
the Appendix.
Total Performance Score for each hospital is essentially the weighted average of the hospital's
scores of each quality domain. The weights for each domain change from year to year. For each
domain, the domain score of a hospital is an unweighted average score of all measures within the
domain. Score for each measure is in turn the higher of improvement point and achievement point.
While improvement point tells how a hospital performs that quality measure relative to the past
period, its achievement point tells how it performs relative to other hospitals of the same periods.
The Total Performance score calculation method is detailed in the Appendix and will be utilized to
construct an instrument as detailed in subsection 1.4.1.
1.3 Data and methodology
1.3.1 Data
The main data set is the quality measures downloaded from the publicly available Hospital Compare
database 2. The data set contains data on achievement point and improvement points of hospitals
2https://data.medicare.gov/data/hospital-compare
5
which participate in HVBP. It also contains the raw quality measures of those hospitals as well as
nonparticipating hospitals. Note that achievement and improvement points capture not only how
well a hospital performs relative to other hospitals in the same period but also how well it performs
relative to its past. Using this measure in the Dierence-in-Dierence analysis will introduce
undesirable serial correlation in quality measures, making the estimation imprecise. Therefore, I
choose to use the raw data of quality measures for the empirical analysis.
There are four domains of care which HVBP rewards. They include clinical outcome domain,
patient experience of care domain, process of care domain and safety domain. I exclude safety
measures out of the empirical analysis because most of the measures are only recently included in
the program (after 2016), therefore, the DID analysis might not have strong statistical power. I also
exclude process of care measures because although they have been included in the program in 2013,
most hospitals do not not report all measures, making the panel heavily imbalanced. Mortality rates
and patient experience of care are the two domains that have relatively good data over the period
of this study.
Patient experience measures are collected by the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare
Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) Survey 3. The survey asks adult patients about their experiences
during their hospital stays, such as whether their nurses always communicated well, whether their
doctors always communicated well, whether hospital stas always responsive to their needs, whether
the hospital environment was "Always" clean and quiet, etc. Mortality rates are the 30-day mortality
rates for heart attack, heart failure and pneumonia, collected from medical Medicare's claim data.
The mortality rates has been risk-adjusted for patient characteristics.
Tables 2 and 3 summarize raw quality measures for HVBP hospitals and non-HVBP hospitals.
For clinical outcome measures, HVBP hospitals are generally better than non-HVBP hospitals.
However, the dierence is small in magnitude, around 1%, and not statistically insignicant. Inter-
estingly, there is more variation in mortality rates among HVBP hospitals rather than non-HVBP
hospitals.
Non-HVBP hospitals are in general better than HVBP hospitals in many of the patient experience
measures, with the dierence around 5 percentage. For example, 81.50 percent of patients in non-
HVBP hospitals report that nurses always communicate well with them, as opposed to 76.56 percent
of patient in HVBP hospitals report so. The dierence is the largest for the Sta Responsiveness




Table 1.2: Summary statistics of Clinical outcome measures
HBVP Hospitals Non-HVBP Hospitals
Heart Attack Mortality 15.30 16.08
1.73 1.43
Heart Failure Mortality 11.51 12.17
1.63 1.49
Pneumonia Mortality 12.26 12.74
2.44 2.07
Note: All mortality rates are 30-day risk adjusted mortality rates. HVBP Hospitals are the Acute
Care Hospitals which are exposed to the Hospital Value Based Purchasing program. Non-HVBP
hospitals are the Critical Access Hospitals which are not exposed to the Hospital Value Based
Purchasing program. Each cell has a column of two statistics: mean and standard deviation.
that for HVBP hospitals. This might be partially because there are much fewer non-HVBP hospitals
(e.g., there are 1039 non-HVBP hospitals as opposed to 3314 HVBP hospitals in 2011). It might
also because they are located in rural areas, where medicine practices might vary signicantly.
I also supplement the main quality data set with information on hospital characteristics, such
as ownership, teaching status, the number of beds, the number of registered nurses, percentage of
Medicare days, the total number of hospital discharge, urban or rural location, percentage of a
hospital's patient days attributable to low-income. The hospital characteristics data is available
in Medicare Provider of Service Files 4, and Medicare Cost Reports 5. Table 4 provides summary
statistics of characteristics of HVBP hospitals and non-HVBP hospitals.
Many of HVBP hospitals are teaching hospitals, with more beds and more nurses. Non-HVBP
hospitals have signicantly less beds than HVBP hospitals. This is mainly due to the regulation for
non-HVBP hospitals that Critical Access Hospitals have not more twenty six beds. HVBP hospitals
and non-HVBP hospitals are similar in ownership status and proportion of low income patients.
Although non_HVBP hospitals have signicantly less number of hospital discharge, they treat the
same percentage of low-income patients. In summary, HVBP hospitals tends to be teaching hospitals,






Table 1.3: Summary statistics of Patient Experience of Care measures
HVBP hospitals Non-HBVP hospitals
Communication with nurse 76.56 81.50
5.89 4.95
Communication with doctor 80.09 84.47
5.04 4.99
Communication about medicine 61.39 66.77
6.31 7.47
Discharge information 83.62 85.84
4.95 5.37
Responsiveness of stas 63.94 74.06
8.40 7.39
Pain management 69.42 72.69
5.26 6.32
Hospital's cleaness 70.68 79.19
7.07 7.08
Hospital Rating 68.04 73.22
9.05 8.31
Note: Communication with nurse for each hospital is the percentage of patients at that hospital
who report nurses always communicate well with them. Communication with doctor is the
percentage of patients who report doctors always communicate well with them. Communication
about medicine is the percentage of patients who report that stas always usage of medicines well.
Discharge information is the percentage of patients who report that they are given information at
their discharge. Responsiveness of stas is the percentage of patients who report that hospital
stas are always responsive to them. Pain management is the percentage of patients who report
that pain management is performed well. Hospital cleanness is the percentage of patients who
report that the hospital is always clean. Hospital rating is the percentage of patients who rates a
hospital 9-10 out of scale from 0 to 10. Each cell in this table has a column of two statistics, mean
and standard variation.
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Table 1.4: Summary statistics of Hospital Characteristics
HVBP hospitals Non-HBVP hospitals
Ownership 0.4 0.4
0.5 0.5
Teaching status 0.3 0.1
0.5 0.2
Number of beds (100s) 2.6 0.3
2.3 0.1
Number of nurses (100s) 3.3 0.3
15.9 0.2
Share of Medicare days 0.4 0.6
0.1 0.2
Total Hospital Discharges (1000s) 1.0 0.1
1.0 0.0
Proportion of low income patients 0.2 0.2
0.1 0.0
Note: Ownership is the indicator variable that takes value of 1 if a hospital is for prot hospital.
Teaching status is the indicator variable that takes value 1 if a hospital has medical school
aliation. Share of Medicare days is the ratio betwen the number of days Medicare patients are
treated in a hospital to the total number days all patients stay in the hospital. Each cell has a
column of two statistics, mean and standard variation.
1.3.2 Methodology
The Dierence in Dierences Analysis for the extensive margin eects of HVBP
I rst explore the extensive margin impact of HVBP on hospital quality by exploiting the introduction
of this payment scheme to hospitals in 2013 over the period of 2008 to 2015. Acute Care hospitals
in the US were exposed to the payment scheme in the years after HVBP but not in the years before
it. Critical Access Hospitals are not exposed to HVBP before and after it was launched. Therefore
Acute Care hospitals is the treatment group and Critical Access Hospitals is the control group.
Although the rst scal year when HVBP started to reward hospitals is 2013, the rst payment
depends on the performance period of 2011. Hospitals were also announced of the structure of the
program earlier that year. Therefore, the Dierence in Dierences analysis chooses 2011 as the year
of policy intervention.
The Dierence in Dierences regression takes the form:
Yhts = ds + dh + dt + β0HV BPh + β1HV BPh × dt + βXXht + eht (1.1)
where Yhts is the quality outcome of hospital h at time t in state s, such as mortality rates or patient
experience measures. ds, dh and dt are state xed eects, hospital specic eects and time eects,
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respectively. HV BPh is the indicator for whether the hospital h is exposed to HVBP. Xht is the
characteristics of the hospitals, including teaching status, ownership status, number of beds, number
of nurses, number of discharges, shares of Medicare days.
The identication of the impact of HVBP replies on several assumptions of the DID. The rst
is that the allocation of the policy intervention was not determined by the outcome variable. This
assumption is realistic because the reason why HVBP exclude Critical Access hospitals is not because
that they perform better or worse than Acute Care hospitals. It is because Critical Access hospitals
serve mostly residents in rural areas who would otherwise be a long distance from emergency care and
Medicare does not want to expose them to too much nancial uncertainty that might be associated
with HVBP. The second assumption is that the treatment and control groups have parallel trends
in outcome before the policy intervention. This assumption can be directly tested using graphical
visualization and the placebo tests that randomly change the policy intervention year to some year
before 2011.
The instrumental variable analysis for the intensive margin eects of HVBP
I proceed with estimating the intensive margin eects of HVBP by exploiting the variation in the
expected incentive payment that Medicare pays for HVBP hospitals. The following regression is
applied to a sample of HVBP hospital from 2012 to 2015.
Yht = dh + ds + dt + βEt [Net Incentiveh,t+2] +X
′
htγ + eht (1.2)
where Yht is the quality outcome measures, Net Incentiveh,t+2 is the incentive the hospital h is
going to get in t + 2 for its performance in t. Xit is a vector of characteristics of hospital i at
time t, e.g., teaching status, ownership, the number of beds, the number of nurses, the proportion
of low-income patients, the share of Medicare patients, and the number of discharges. eht is the
idiosyncratic error. dh, dt, ds are hospital, time and state xed eects. There is a time lag between
the Net Incentiveh,t+2 and quality measures Yht because by the design of HVBP the incentive
payment is paid out in two year times from the performance period when the hospitals choose its
quality levels.
Recall that Net Incentiveh,t+2 = Adj Factorh,t+2 × FFSh,t+2 where FFSh,t+2 is the Fee for
Service amount hospital h obtain from treating Medicare patients and Adj Factorh,t+2 is the scalar
that Medicare will adjust its FFS payment based quality of hospital h as well as all other hospitals.
In the regression (1.3) I will use adjustment factor Adj Factorh,t+2 for the incentive variable instead
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of Net Incentiveh,t+2. The main reason is that Medicare does not publish data on incentive payment
for participating hospitals, only its summary statistics. I can calculate the incentive payment using
data on Medicare Fee for Service payment for all medical condition groups, but this data is only
available for 2014 and 2015.
6 Using the short panel of 2014 and 2015 with just over two thousand hospitals might aect
the precision of the estimate of parameters. Moreover, because FFSh,t+2 captures the structural
characteristics of hospitals, such as the number of beds, the number of interns, residents, etc., one
can think of Adj Factorh,t+2 as the normalized incentive payment by the size of the hospitals.
One challenge to estimating the above regression is to construct a measure of hospital beliefs
Et [Adj Factorh,t+2] which are unobserved. I will circumvent this issue by constructing an empirical
analog using two assumptions. I assume that in year t hospitals base their expectation on knowledge
of their past observed quality measures in year t− 1 and the adjustment factor in year t+ 1, which
depends on observed quality measures in year t − 1 as well. This is a realistic assumption because
hospitals are aware of their past quality measures in relation to other hospitals since Center of
Medicare and Medicaid has been releasing raw quality rates on its Hospital Compare website for
these conditions since 2007. Moreover, the adjustment factor in year t + 1 is in the information
set of hospital at time t, because CMS published proposed and nal rule for adjustment factor for
each year a year before that 7. Second, I assume that hospitals are right on average, that is their
expectations match the realized incentive payment in the future.
Accordingly I will construct a measure of expected payment paid in year t + 2 as a linear t of
the raw percent rates in years t− 1 for the period 2012 to 2015 8.






where Yk,h,t−t is one of all quality measures of Patient Experience Outcome domain and Mortality
Rates indexed by k. Adj Factorh,t+1 is hospital h 's adjustment factor. Xht is hospital h's
characteristics.
Estimating equation (1.2) via OLS using the empirical analog of adjustment factor as the key
explanatory variable introduces endogeneity since it is based on a lagged value of raw quality
measures. This endogeneity concern includes, but is not limited to mean reversion. For example,
6The same is used to calculate incentive payments and categorize hospitals into big and small winners (losers) in
the summary statistics of hospital characteristics by HVBP hospitals' incentive payment - Table 1.4.1
7For example, CMS published in 2016 the proposed and nal rule for 2017's hospital payment.
8All the quality measures and Adjustment Factor are available in year 2011, however the rst period of data is lost
due to the use of the one period lagged Adjustment Factor to predict for the current Adjustment Factor.
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with the mortality rate over 2009 - 2011 was temporarily high for hospital h then hospital h could
plausibly return to a lower long-run value in the later years, even in the absence of the (less) incentive
payment. In the spirit of Gupta (2016)'s work, I propose an instrument for the expected adjustment
factor using as the adjustment factor generated from historical data, i.e., the year 2008. This is a
valid instrument under the assumption E (εhtεhs) = 0 for t 6= s, i.e., the unobserved time-varying
error term of the quality process is serially uncorrelated.
I construct an instrumental variable Zh as the scaled predicted Adj factorh using the quality
measures in 2008 and the methodology of computing adjustment factor and incentive payment
Services (2011). This time period is not included in the estimation of regressions (1.2) and (1.3). I
detail this calculation step by step in the Appendix. Assuming that E (eh2008, ehs) = 0 for s > 2011,
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1.4 Empirical Results
1.4.1 Summary of distribution of HVBP payment
Before presenting the evidence of the intensive margin and extensive margin of HVBP's impact on
hospital quality, I provide several statistics that shed light on the distributional eect of HVBP.
Table 5 summarizes and compares characteristics of hospitals that receive positive net-payment
from HVBP with the hospitals that receive negative amounts. Losing hospitals tend to be teaching
hospitals, for-prot, in the rural area, bigger in size, and serve higher percentage of low-income
patients. They also treat signicantly more patients than the winning hospitals.
Table 6 investigates characteristics of big winning hospitals versus small winning hospitals and
big losing hospitals versus small losing hospitals. Columns 1 and 2 show that among the winners,
the high earning hospitals tend to be teaching hospitals, non-prot, in rural area, bigger in size, and
treat more Medicare patients. Columns 3 and 4 show that among the hospitals that lose money,
the big loser tends to be teaching hospitals, non-prot, in rural area, bigger in size and treat more
patients. These statistics reveal that hospitals that are teaching hospitals, non-prot, big in size,
treat more Medicare patients, in rural area are most exposed to HVBP. This makes a good sense
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Table 1.5: Summary of hospital characteristics by their performance in the HVBP program
(1) (2) (1) - (2)
Winners Losers
Teaching Status 0.294 0.412 -0.118
(0.011) (0.014) (0.020)
For prot 0.342 0.396 -0.054
(0.012) (0.012) (0.018)
Urban 0.309 0.188 0.120
(0.010) (0.011) (0.016)
No. of beds (100s) 2.099 3.131 -1.031
(0.061) (0.069) (0.094)
No. of nurses(1000s) 3.084 4.235 -1.151
(0.400) (0.483) (0.678)
Share of low income patients 0.145 0.186 -0.041
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007)
Share of Medicare days 0.388 0.361 0.027
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
No. of discharges (1000s) 0.850 1.186 -0.336
(0.028) (0.029) (0.044)
Note: The HVBP payment is calculated by author using the Medicare's Inpatient Payment for all
diagnosis-related groups of medical conditions and the Hospital Compare's incentive percentage and
withhold percentage. Winners are HVBP hospitals that receive positive HVBP payments. Losers
are HVBP hospitals that receive negative payment.The statistics reported are for scal year 2015.
Each cell contains of mean and standard error, which are calculated using bootstrap.
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Table 1.6: Summary of hospital characteristics by the performance in the HVBP program
(1) (2) (1)-(2) (3) (4) (3) - (4) (1) - (3)
Big Small Big Small
winners winners losers losers
Teaching Status 0.37 0.22 0.14 0.56 0.27 0.29 -0.26
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
For prot 0.29 0.39 -0.10 0.33 0.46 -0.13 0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Urban 0.21 0.41 -0.20 0.06 0.32 -0.26 0.32
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
No. beds (100s) 2.80 1.40 1.40 4.46 1.81 2.65 -2.44
(0.10) (0.05) (0.09) (0.11) (0.06) (0.12) (0.10)
No. nurses(100s) 4.72 1.45 3.27 6.67 1.80 4.86 -4.42
(0.80) (0.07) (0.80) (0.95) (0.07) (0.95) (0.62)
Low income patients 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.19 0.18 0.00 -0.05
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Medicare days 0.39 0.39 0.01 0.35 0.37 -0.02 0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
No. discharges(1000s) 1.24 0.46 0.77 1.78 0.59 1.19 -1.11
(0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
Note: Big winners (losers) are dened as HVBP hospitals that earn (lose) higher than the fty
percentile of payment of the winning (losing) group. The third colum is the dierence between
column1 and column 2. Column 6 is the dierence between column 3 and column 4. Column 7 is
the dierence between column 1 and column 4. Each cell has a column of two statistics, mean and
standard variation.
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because an incremental change in quality (measured in Total Performance Score) is multiplied with
Medicare's Fee for Service payment to obtain the value-based incentive payment, and Medicare's Fee
for Service payment is increasing in size of hospital, the proportion of low-income patients treated
and whether the hospital is in rural area.
Comparing columns 1 and 3 reveals how the distributional eects of HVBP. Big losers, in
comparison with big winners, tend to be teaching hospitals, in rural areas, have a signicantly higher
number of beds and nurses, serve a higher percentage of low-income patients, treat more Medicare
patients and non-medicare patients. So from the distribution point of view, HVBP redistributes
Medicare's funding from hospitals from big rural hospitals who serve more Medicare, low-income
patients to smaller sized hospitals in the urban areas with less Medicare, low-income patients.
Note that HVBP value-based incentive payment depends on hospital performances as well as
hospital's Fee for Services payment. Therefore variances in the volume of hospital discharges and
the total amount of Medicare payment will aect incentive payment range. In the Appendix, I
report the summary statistics for the same hospital characteristics and big versus small winners and
losers is dened not by HVBP value-based incentive dollar payment but by their percentage change
of Medicare payment. I nd the same pattern described above even with this measure of incentive
payment.
1.4.2 Extensive margin of HVBP's impacts on quality measure: Dier-
ence in Dierence Analysis
Dierence in Dierence Analysis for Patient Experience Outcomes
This section provides evidence of the impact of HVBP on the Patient Experience Outcomes. Figures
4.1 and 4.2 show the average trends of patient experience outcome measures of HVBP hospitals and
non-HVBP hospitals. I normalize the average trends of the two hospital groups by subtracting
from both their associated means in the year 2008. For most of the measures such as Nurse
Communication, Discharge Communication, Responsiveness, Pain Management, Cleanness, Hospital
Rating, I nd an increase in the dierence between the two hospital groups after 2011. However, for
some measures such as Nurse Communication, Cleanness, and Hospital Rating, it seems that HVBP
hospitals started to change their behavior before 2011 in anticipation of HVBP.
Table 7 presents results from DID regressions (1.1) which regresses the raw patient experience
measures on the program xed eect, HV BPh , time xed eect, Post11t, the interaction terms,
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Figure 1.1: Average trends in patient experience communication measures of HVBP hospitals and
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Figure 1.2: Average trends in other patient experience measures of HVBP hospitals and non-HVBP
hospitals in 2008 - 2015
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The regression results in Table 7 show that for some measures of patient experience domain, four
out of seven measures experience small but statistically signicant improvements in HVBP hospitals
compared to the non-HVBP hospitals after HVBP. For example, the percentage of patients in HVBP
reporting that nurses always communicate well in HVBP hospitals is on average nearly 1% higher
than that in the non-HVBP hospitals relative their dierence before HVBP. This is nearly 20% of
the standard variation of 5.89 reported in Table 3. Similarly, after HVBP the rate at which HVBP
hospitals are reported to always be clean is 1.6%, i.e., 20 % of its standard deviation, higher than
the rate of non-HVBP hospitals, relative to before HVBP. The coecients of the controls also reveal
that on average non-prot hospitals with a high share of Medicare days tend to perform worse in
patient experience domain than for-prot hospitals with a low share of Medicare days.
Table 1.7: Eect of the HVBP on Patient Experience measures: DID analysis
Nurse Doctor Respon Pain Medicine Clean- Discharge Hospital
Comn Comn siveness Mngn Comn ness Info Rating
After HVBP 2.6∗∗∗ 1.5∗∗∗ 2.6∗∗∗ 1.4∗∗∗ 4.2∗∗∗ 1.0∗∗∗ 4.3∗∗∗ 4.0∗∗∗
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3)
HVBP * After 0.9∗∗∗ -0.4∗ 0.8∗∗ 0.3 -0.3 1.6∗∗∗ -0.3 0.3
HVBP (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (0.3)
Ownership -0.4∗ -0.3 -0.8∗∗∗ -0.3 -0.5∗ -0.2 -0.3 -0.7∗∗
(0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
Teaching status 0.3 0.1 0.6∗∗ 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.6∗∗
(0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.2)
Number of beds 0.2∗ 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2∗ 0.2
(100s) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Number of nurses 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0∗ 0.0∗ 0.0∗∗∗
(100s) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Share of -6.6∗∗∗ -0.7 -8.4∗∗∗ -4.1∗∗∗ -6.8∗∗∗ -3.2∗∗ -9.6∗∗∗ -8.8∗∗∗
Medicare days (0.9) (0.8) (1.2) (1.1) (1.1) (1.1) (0.9) (1.2)
Number of -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.9∗∗ 0.3
discharges (10,000s) (0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2)
R2 0.80 0.81 0.84 0.68 0.71 0.79 0.74 0.84
Observations 24083 24083 24082 24079 24069 24083 24080 24083
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include HBVP xed eect, state xed eects
and hospital xed eects, and use cluster variance at hospital level.
In order to examine potential heterogeneity in the eects of HVBP on patient experience mea-
sures, I include in the baseline regression equation (1.1) interaction terms between HV BPh, Post11t
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Table 1.8: Heterogeneity eect of the HVBP program in Patient Experience measures: DID Analysis
with interaction terms
Nurse Doctor Respon- Pain Medicine Clean- Discharge Hospital
Comn Comn siveness Mngn Comn ness Info Rating
After HVBP 2.7∗∗∗ 1.5∗∗∗ 2.6∗∗∗ 1.4∗∗∗ 4.2∗∗∗ 1.1∗∗∗ 4.3∗∗∗ 4.0∗∗∗
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3)
HVBP * After 1.8∗∗∗ -0.3 1.0∗ 0.6 -0.4 2.3∗∗∗ -0.2 0.3
HVBP (0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3) (0.5)
Ownership -0.3 -0.1 -0.7∗∗ -0.1 -0.4 0.1 -0.2 -0.6∗
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3)
Teaching status 0.3 0.0 0.6∗ 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5∗
(0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3)
Number of beds 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.3∗ 0.1 -0.0
(100s) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Number of nurses 0.1∗∗ 0.0 0.1∗∗ 0.0 0.1∗ 0.0 0.1∗ 0.1∗∗
(100s) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Share of -5.2∗∗∗ -0.4 -7.8∗∗∗ -3.5∗∗ -6.6∗∗∗ -2.0 -9.3∗∗∗ -8.3∗∗∗
Medicare days (0.9) (0.8) (1.2) (1.1) (1.2) (1.2) (0.9) (1.3)
Number of -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.8∗∗ 0.1
discharges (10,000s) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
HVBP*Post11 -0.2 -0.3∗ -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1
*Ownership (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1) (0.2)
HVBP*Post11 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.1
*Teaching (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.2)
HVBP*Post11 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1∗ 0.1∗ 0.2 0.1∗∗ 0.2∗
*No. of Beds (0.1) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0) (0.1)
HVBP*Post11 -0.1∗∗ -0.0 -0.1∗∗ -0.0 -0.1∗ -0.0 -0.0∗ -0.1∗
*No. of Nurses (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
HVBP*Post11 -3.2∗∗∗ -0.8∗ -1.5∗ -1.3∗ -0.4 -2.8∗∗∗ -0.4 -1.3
*Share of (0.5) (0.4) (0.7) (0.5) (0.6) (0.7) (0.5) (0.7)
Medicare days
HVBP*Post11 0.3∗ 0.3∗∗ 0.4∗ 0.1 0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.3
*No.of discharges (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1) (0.2)
R2 0.81 0.81 0.84 0.68 0.71 0.79 0.74 0.84
Observations 24083 24083 24082 24079 24069 24083 24080 24083
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include state xed eects and hospital xed eects,
and use robust variance - covariance structure.
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and hospital characteristics. Table 8 reveals that there are signicant variations in the ways that
hospitals of dierent characteristics respond to HVBP. For example, from before to after HVBP,
for-prot, big sized HVBP hospitals with many nurses and high proportion of Medicare patients
improve patient experience less than non-prot hospitals, small sized HVBP hospitals with less
nurses and high proportion of Medicare patients. This might be at rst counter intuitive because for
big sized hospitals with high proportion of Medicare patients, their marginal rewards to incremental
increase in quality are higher than that of small hospitals with low proportion of Medicare patients.
However, their negative responses can be rationalized by considering the cost of complying with the
program and improving quality. . Estimating the cost of improving each of the quality measures or
quality domains is a dicult task and outside the scope of this paper because of the lack of reliable
cost data and the tight correlation between quality measures within same quality domain.
The most critical DID assumption is the parallel trend assumption, which requires that in
the absence of treatment, the treatment and the control groups have common trends in outcome
variables. Figures 1 and 2 have shown clearly that some HBVP hospitals already responded to the
anticipation of the policy before the policy actually started. To test this common trend assumption,
I run two placebo tests, one of which assumes HVBP starts in 2009 and the other assumes HVBP
starts in 2010. If the common trend assumptions are warranted, the estimated coecient β1 of the
interaction term between time and policy xed eect should be statistically insignicant. Table 9
shows the results of the regression which assumes that the time of policy intervention was 2009. The
result of the placebo test which assumes the time of policy intervention was 2010 is reported in the
Appendix.
The regression in Table 9 shows that for the most of measures, except Nurse Communication
and Hospital Cleanness measures, there is no signicant dierence in the dierence between the
two groups of hospitals before and after 2009. However, the other placebo test in Table 19 in the
Appendix shows that for Doctor Communication, Medicine Communication and Hospital Cleanness,
there is a signicant change in the dierence between the groups of hospitals before and after 2009.
In order to take into account possible changes in hospitals quality prior to the program starting year,
I re-estimate the DID regression with the time of policy intervention being 2009. The results are
presented in Table 10. There is no evidence that the estimated coecient β1 changes by a statistically
signicant magnitude. For example, the estimated eect on Nurse Communication measure was 0.9
% with a condence interval of [0.5%, 1.3%] while the updated estimated eect is 1.1%. Therefore
the conclusion that HVBP has a small but statistically signicant impact on some of the measure
of patient experience outcome holds true.
19
Table 1.9: Placebo Test for DID Analysis of HCAHPS measures - Placebo time of intervention: 2009
Nurse Doctor Respon- Pain Medicine Clean- Discharge Hospital
Comn Comn siveness Mngn Comn ness Info Rating
Post09 1.2∗∗∗ 0.6∗∗ 1.5∗∗∗ 1.2∗∗∗ 1.9∗∗∗ 1.2∗∗∗ 1.7∗∗∗ 2.5∗∗∗
(0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3)
HVBP*Post09 0.6∗∗ 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 0.6∗ -0.0 0.4
(0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3)
Ownership 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.3 0.1 0.4 -0.4 -0.3
(0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.2) (0.4)
Teaching status 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.0
(0.3) (0.2) (0.4) (0.3) (0.4) (0.3) (0.2) (0.3)
No. of beds 0.2 0.2 0.3∗ 0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.3∗ 0.5∗∗
(100s) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.2)
No. of nurses 0.0 0.0 0.1∗ 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0
(100s) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Share of -0.6 0.8 -1.5 0.2 0.9 0.3 -0.4 -0.2
Medicare days (1.8) (1.7) (2.5) (2.3) (2.6) (1.8) (1.6) (2.4)
R2 0.89 0.88 0.91 0.81 0.81 0.89 0.86 0.91
Observations 10255 10255 10255 10255 10255 10255 10255 10255
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include HBVP xed eect, state xed eects
and hospital xed eects, and use cluster variance at hospital level.
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Table 1.10: Updated DID Analysis of HCAHPS measures - Policy intervention in 2009
Nurse Doctor Respon- Pain Medicine Clean- Discharge Hospital
Comn Comn siveness Mngn Comn ness Info Rating
Post09 2.5∗∗∗ 1.3∗∗∗ 2.7∗∗∗ 1.7∗∗∗ 3.8∗∗∗ 1.4∗∗∗ 4.0∗∗∗ 4.1∗∗∗
(0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (0.3)
HVBP*Post09 1.1∗∗∗ -0.1 0.7∗ 0.1 -0.1 1.5∗∗∗ -0.2 0.5
(0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (0.3)
Ownership -0.4∗ -0.2 -0.7∗∗ -0.2 -0.4∗ -0.1 -0.2 -0.6∗
(0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3)
Teaching status 0.4∗ 0.1 0.7∗∗ 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3∗ 0.7∗∗
(0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
No. of beds 0.4∗∗∗ 0.2∗ 0.4∗∗ 0.2∗∗ 0.3∗∗ 0.1 0.4∗∗∗ 0.4∗∗
(100s) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
No.of nurses 0.0∗ 0.0 0.0∗∗ 0.0 0.0∗∗ 0.0∗∗ 0.0∗∗∗ 0.0∗∗∗
(100s) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Share of -10.0∗∗∗ -1.8∗ -11.9∗∗∗ -5.5∗∗∗ -11.2∗∗∗ -5.4∗∗∗ -14.1∗∗∗ -12.2∗∗∗
Medicare days (1.0) (0.8) (1.2) (1.1) (1.2) (1.1) (1.0) (1.3)
No.of -0.7∗ -0.2 -0.6 -0.3 -0.9∗ -0.6 -1.6∗∗ -0.4
discharges (0.3) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.4) (0.3) (0.5) (0.3)
(10,000s)
R2 0.98 0.81 0.83 0.67 0.68 0.79 0.69 0.84
Observations 24083 24083 24082 24079 24069 24083 24080 24083
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include HBVP xed eect, state xed eects
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Figure 1.3: Dierences in other Clinical outcome measures in 2008 - 2015
DID results for Mortality measures
This section presents evidence of the impacts of HVBPs on mortality measures. Figure 4.3 shows the
normalized average trends of mortality rates in HVBP hospitals and non-HVBP hospitals. While
heart attack mortality rate trends down signicantly by more than 2% over the study period, heart
failure mortality trends up by nearly 1%. Interestingly, before HVBP, pneumonia mortality rate
increases by 0.4%; however, this trend subsides and reverses in the years after HVBP.
As predictable from the average trends in Figure 4.3, the DID regressions reported in Table 11
indicate that HVBP has resulted in no signicant change in heart attack mortality, heart failure
mortality and pneumonia mortality rates.
I proceed by investigating whether HVBP hospitals of dierent characteristics respond to HVBP
dierently and whether the heterogeneity might be averaged out in regressions reported in Table
11. I regress again the DID regression 1.1 including the interaction terms of HV BPh, Post11t
and hospital characteristics such as ownership, teaching status, number of nurses, number of beds,
number of discharges and share of Medicare days. The regression results in Table 20 in the Appendix
show that mortality measures do not experience signicant change before and after HVBP, and the
lack of response in mortality measures holds true for all HVBP hospitals of dierent characteristics.
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Table 1.11: Impact of HVBP on Mortality measures - DID Analysis
Heart Attack Mortality Heart Failure Mortality Pneumonia Mortality
After HVBP -0.6 0.9∗∗∗ -0.6
(0.6) (0.2) (0.6)
HVBP * After HVBP -0.8 0.1 -0.8
(0.7) (0.3) (0.7)
Ownership -0.3 0.6 -0.3
(0.6) (0.3) (0.6)
Teaching status -0.9∗ 0.2 -0.9∗
(0.4) (0.5) (0.4)
Number of beds 1.4∗ -1.3∗∗ 1.4∗
(100s) (0.7) (0.4) (0.7)
Number of nurses 0.3 0.4 0.3
(100s) (0.4) (0.2) (0.4)
Share of 2.9 0.7 2.9
Medicare days (2.2) (1.2) (2.2)
Number of discharges -0.9 0.2 -0.9
(10,000s) (1.4) (1.1) (1.4)
R2 0.682826 0.577170 0.682826
Observations 215 547 215
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include HBVP xed eect, state xed eects
and hospital xed eects, and use cluster variance at hospital level.
Similar to the DID analysis for patient experience measures, I also run the same placebo tests for
the mortality measures in order to test for the common trend assumption. Table 12 indicates that in
the placebo regressions that assume 2009 as a year of policy intervention, from before to after HVBP,
HVBP hospitals do not change their mortality rates signicantly compare to non-HVBP hospitals.
Table 20 in the Appendix present the same results for the placebo test that assumes that the policy
started in 2010. In summary, the DID analysis for the mortality rates has shown consistently that
HVBP has no signicant eects on hospitals' clinical outcomes.
1.4.3 Intensive margin of HVBP's impacts on hospital quality
This section presents results of the intensive margin analysis of HVBP's impacts on hospital quality.
The analysis exploits variations in incentive payment HVBP hospitals expect to be paid. Recall that
the regression will not use the incentive payment in dollars but will instead use the adjustment factor
that is used to adjust Fee for Service baseline payment. Expected adjustment factor is proxied by a
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Table 1.12: Placebo Test for DID Analysis for Clinical outcome measures: Placebo policy in 2009
Heart Attack Mortality Heart Failure Mortality Pneumonia Mortality
Post09 -0.4∗∗∗ 0.2∗∗∗ -0.4∗∗∗
(0.1) (0.0) (0.1)
HVBP* Post09 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1
(0.1) (0.0) (0.1)
Ownership 0.0 -0.0 0.0
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Teaching status 0.2 0.1 0.2
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Number of beds -0.1 0.0 -0.1
(100s) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Number of nurses -0.0 -0.0 -0.0
(100s) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Share of 0.3 -1.0∗∗ 0.3
Medicare days (0.6) (0.3) (0.6)
R2 0.82 0.84 0.82
Observations 7810 10982 7810
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include HBVP xed eect, state xed eects
and hospital xed eects, and use cluster variance at hospital level.
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linear function of quality measure and the associated adjust factor in the previous period. The graph
that shows tness of the predicted adjustment factor is provided in the Appendix. The predicted
adjustment factor explains about 44% of variations in the realized adjustment factor.
By the construction of the expected adjustment factor constructed by previous quality measures
might be endogenous due to mean reversion. To address this issue I construct an instrument which
is the adjustment factor generated by quality measures in the year 2008.
Table 13 summarizes the regression results for patient experience measures. The coecients
of expected Adjustment Factor is consistently negative for all the Patient Experience measures.
This would mean that hospitals that expect to receive higher payments in the two periods time
would actually do worse than hospitals that expect to receive less payments. In other words,
there is evidence of lower quality hospitals, measured by the expected incentive payment based
on their past performance, catching up with higher quality hospitals. To put dollars into the
estimated coecients, consider a hospital which expects to move from the 50th percentile to the
75th percentile of the Adjustment Factor distribution or the Total Performance Score distribution in
2015 9. This movement is equivalent to almost USD 50,000 of incentive payment, a third of the net
incentive payment standard deviation. 10. The coecient for the nurse communication regression
implies that expecting to receive USD 50,000 more, the hospital will decrease its performance
by 0.187%, i.e., three times of standard deviation. The patient experience that responds most
signicantly is medicine communication, by a magnitude of 0.024%. Consistent with the extensive
margin analysis, for-prot and big size (measured by the number of beds) hospitals is negatively
correlated with the quality. The lower panel of Table 14 provides some test statistics and p-value
for under-identication test, over-identication and weak-identication test. Overall, they imply
that the model is identied and that I can cautiously conclude that the proposed instruments are
not weak. The over-identication test shows that there are three instances where the exclusion
restrictions assumptions are rejected. However, given the estimated
coecients of the predicted adjustment factor are consistently negative over all measures within
patient experience domain, the magnitude or at least the sign of the estimated coecients are
reliable.
I proceed the same estimation for the Clinical quality measures. Consistent and complementary
with the extensive margin analysis, Table 14 shows that even within HVBP program, heart attack
9The distribution of the two variable are the same because Adjustment Factor is a linear function of Total
Performance Score and the slope of that function is endogenously determined by the total funding available for
the program.
10The average Medicare Fee for Service payment is 19,014,427. The 50th and 75th percentiles of Adjustment Factor
distribution are 1.003229 and 1.000601 correspondingly. Standard derivation of the net incentive payment is $165252.
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Table 1.13: Intensive margin of the eects of HVBP Payment on Patient Experience measures
Nurse Doctor Respon- Pain Medicine Clean- Discharge Hospital
Comn Comn siveness Mngn Comn ness Info Rating
Predicted -7.127∗∗∗ -4.482∗∗∗ -7.780∗∗∗ -2.545∗∗ -9.419∗∗∗ -5.172∗∗∗ -4.670∗∗ -6.668∗∗∗
Adjustment (1.418) (1.068) (1.722) (0.952) (1.981) (1.432) (1.683) (1.824)
Factor
Teaching -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001
status (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Ownership -0.010∗ -0.007∗ -0.011 0.001 -0.012∗ -0.006 -0.012∗∗ -0.013∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
No. of beds -0.002 -0.003∗ -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(100s) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
No. of nurses 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗
(100s) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Low income 0.011 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.003 -0.009 -0.003 -0.005
Patient Share (0.021) (0.015) (0.025) (0.014) (0.029) (0.020) (0.025) (0.026)
No. discharges 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(10,000s) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share of 0.031 0.038∗ 0.035 0.019 0.022 -0.007 0.030 0.027
Medicare days (0.021) (0.017) (0.028) (0.015) (0.029) (0.021) (0.025) (0.027)
No. Obs 7084 7084 7084 7084 7084 7084 7084 7084
Under 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
identication
Over 0.035 0.189 0.062 0.079 0.001 0.172 0.183 0.001
identication
Weak 38.233 38.233 38.233 38.233 38.233 38.233 38.233 38.233
identication
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The underidentication test has the null hypothesis that the
excluded variables are relevant, meaning correlated with the predicted Adjustment Factor. The
overidentifcation test has the null hypothesis that the exclusion restriction holds. p-value > 0.05
means there is no evidence against the exclusion assumption of the proposed IVs. The statistics for
weak identication test is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic statistic, with the critical values
being 19.93 and the higher statistics means rejection of the null that the instruments are weak.
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mortality and pneumonia mortality do not decrease signicantly for hospitals that expect higher
incentive payment. It also provides a relatively weak evidence that heart failure mortality actually
increases for hospitals that expect to receive a high incentive payment.
Table 1.14: Intensive margin of the eects of HVBP Payment on Clinical outcome measures
Heart Attack Mortality Heart Failure Mortality Pneumonia Mortality
Predicted -0.054 1.109∗ -0.960
Adjustment Factor (0.493) (0.488) (0.637)
Teaching status -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ownership 0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of beds 0.000 0.001 0.000
(100s) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of nurses 0.000∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(100s) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Low income 0.003 -0.000 -0.013
Patient Share (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
Number of -0.000 0.000 0.000
discharges (10,000s) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share of 0.013 0.003 0.018
Medicare days (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Observations 6943 7085 7084
p-value of 0.000 0.000 0.000
underidentication test
p-value of 0.628 0.536 0.680
overidentication test
Statistics 34.380 38.337 38.349
weak identicantion test
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The underidentication test has the null hypothesis that
the excluded variables are relevant, meaning correlated with the predicted Adjustment Factor. The
overidentifcation test has the null hypothesis that the exclusion restriction holds. p-value > 0.05
means there is no evidence against the exclusion assumption of the proposed IVs. The statistics
for weak identication test is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic, with the critical value being
19.93 and the higher statistics means rejection of the null that the instruments are weak.
1.5 Concluding remarks
This paper examines both intensive margin and extensive margin of the impact on hospital quality
of Medicare's Hospital Value-Based Purchasing, one of the largest value-based payment that the US
government implements
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Exploiting the exogenous introduction of this payment scheme to Acute Care hospitals and not
to Critical Access hospitals, Dierence-in-Dierences analysis shows that HVBP only has limited
extensive margin eects on hospital quality measures. Comparing the hospitals which participate
in HVBP with the ones which do not, I nd that relative to non-HVBP hospitals, HVBP hospitals
improve signicantly in only half of the patient experience measures from before to after HVBP. The
magnitude of the improvement is around 20% of those measures' standard deviation. Other patient
experience measures also experience increases but by a non-signicant magnitude. I also nd that
HVBP does not have an impact on mortality rates.
The DID analysis also indicates that among measures which HVBP hospitals do respond to
incentive payments, HVBP hospitals of dierent characteristics respond dierently. The responsive-
ness of HVBP hospitals to HVBP is negatively correlated with whether they are for-prot hospitals,
bigger in sized and treat a higher proportion of Medicare patients. This result suggests that the
cost of compliance for hospitals to HVBP, which including improving and reporting quality, might
outweigh the incentive payment, even for HVBP hospitals that would benet from HVBP payment
scheme the most.
Consistent with the extensive margin analysis, the intensive margin analysis also shows that
conditional on participating in HVBP, hospitals' patient experience domain measures are also more
responsive to expected incentive payment than hospital clinical outcome measures. Moreover, the
intensive margin analysis additionally shows that among HVBP hospitals, hospitals that expect to
receive more incentive payment in the future actually perform worse than hospitals that expect to
receive less incentive payment.
Summary statistics of hospital characteristics by HVBP incentive payment has pointed out that
the program redistributes money from large sized rural hospitals which treat many low-income,
Medicare payment to smaller size urban hospitals which treat less low-income, Medicare patients.
Given the results of small to no signicant eects of HVBP on hospital quality measures, HVBP's
impact might largely be distributional. Moreover, the direction of this re-distribution of funding
might not be desirable.
It might well be that the smaller sized hospitals in the urban areas receive a higher amount of
value-based incentive payment because they improve quality more than the big sized rural hospitals.
However, as the DID analysis will show below, there are no signicant improvements in many
quality measures of participating hospitals relative to non-participating hospitals. The IV analysis
also shows that high expected incentive payment actually discourage hospitals from improving
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quality. Therefore, the eects of HVBP might largely be re-distributional and the direction of
this redistribution might not be desirable.
The analyses in this version of the paper have several drawbacks some of which can be improved
upon. First, although the DID analysis has carefully controlled for hospital xed eects, state
xed eects and other hospital observable characteristics, the control hospitals, i.e., Critical Access
hospitals might be fundamentally dierent from Acute Care hospitals. The DID synthetic control
approach might be more suitable to make analysis more robust.
This paper also does not provide an empirical test for mechanisms that give rise to the empirical
results found here. For example, the results that HVBP hospitals improve on some dimension of
patient experience quality but not mortality rates might be due that for hospitals reduction of
mortality rates might be more dicult to improve than patient experience. However, it is out of
this paper's cope, for example, to estimate the marginal cost of improving each quality measures.
Finally, this paper is not able to make a normative statement about HVBP's eects. For
example, I am not able to answer the question of whether the eects that HVBP has on some
of the hospital patient experience but not on mortality rates are actually welfare improving. This
is an important question for designing optimal value-based payment scheme, especially if improving
patient experience is costly.
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Figure 1.4: HVBP Realized Adjustment Factor versus Predicted Expected Adjustment Factor
Appendix
Calculation of scaled predicted Adjustment Factor I used to Center of Medicare and
Medicaid (CMS) 's methodology to approximate for the Total Performance Score (TPS) for all
HVBP hospitals. To translate TPS into Adjustment Factor, CMS uses the linear exchange function
where the the slope is determined by the total budget available for this program. Because this
budget available is exogenously determined by the CMS, the variations in Total Performance fully
capture the variations in the Adjustment Factor.
I am not able to calculate exactly the Total Performance score with the publicly available,
hospital-level Hospital Compare data. The reason is that in this data set, the measure dates of
the mortality rate do not match the performance period used in the CMS's calculation of TPS. I
am applying for medical, individual-claims data, which will allow me to obtain the mortality rates
for the appropriate period. The patient experience outcome measures do not have this issue, and
therefore can be used to proxy for Total Performance score. Because the weight of patient experience
domain in this calculation varies from 30% to 50%, the proxy is able to capture well the variations
in the real Total Performance score.
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Domain\Year Measure Names 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Patient
Experience
Communication with Nurses x x x x x
Communication with Doctors x x x x x
Communication about Medicines x x x x x
Discharge Information x x x x x
Responsiveness of Hospital Sta x x x x x
Cleanliness and Quietness of Hospital Environment x x x x x




Acute Myocardial Infarction 30-Day Mortality Rate x x x x x
Heart Failure 30-Day Mortality Rate x x x x x
Pneumonia 30-Day Mortality Rate x x x x x
Eciency Medicare Spending Per Beneciary x x x
Safety
Surgical Site Infections - Colon Surgery x x
Elective Delivery Prior to 39 Completed Weeks
Gestation
x
Complication/Patient safety for selected indicators
Composite
x x x
Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus x
Clostridium dicile Infection x
Central Line-Associated Blood Stream Infection x x x




Fibrinolytic Therapy Received Within 30 Minutes
of Hospital Arrival
x x x x x
Primary PCI Received Within 90 Minutes of
Hospital Arrival
x x x
Blood Cultures Performed in the Emergency
Department Prior to Initial Antibiotic Received in
Hospital
x x x
Initial Antibiotic Selection for CAP in
Immunocompetent Patient
x x x x
Discharge Instructions x x x
Prophylactic Antibiotic Received Within One Hour
Prior to Surgical Incision
x x x
Prophylactic Antibiotic Selection for Surgical
Patients
x x x x
Prophylactic Antibiotics Discontinued Within 24
Hours After Surgery End Time
x x x x
Cardiac Surgery Patients with Controlled 6AM
Postoperative Serum Glucose
x x x
Surgery Patients on a Beta Blocker Prior to Arrival
That Received a Beta Blocker During the
Perioperative Period
x x x x
Surgery Patients with Recommended Venous
Thromboembolism Prophylaxis Ordered
x x
Surgery Patients Who Received Appropriate
Venous Thromboembolism Prophylaxis Within 24
Hours Prior to Surgery to 24 Hours After Surgery
x x x x
Table 1.15: Full List of Quality measures included in HVBP program in 2013 - 2017
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Table 1.16: Summary of hospital characteristics by the performance in the HVBP program - Incentive
payment measured in percentage change
(1) (2) (1) - (2)
Positive Payment Negative Payment
Teaching Status 0.294 0.410 -0.116
(0.012) (0.014) (0.020)
For prot 0.343 0.398 -0.054
(0.012) (0.015) (0.016)
Urban 0.312 0.195 0.117
(0.012) (0.010) (0.017)
No. of beds (100s) 2.117 3.117 -0.999
(0.055) (0.066) (0.089)
No. of nurses(1000s) 3.000 4.339 -1.339
(0.423) (0.639) (0.637)
Share of low income patients 0.144 0.187 -0.043
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Share of Medicare days 0.389 0.361 0.028
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
No. of discharges (1000s) 0.844 1.189 -0.345
(0.020) (0.026) (0.033)
Note: The HVBP payment is net percentage change in the Medicare payment, calculated by
author using the Hospital Compare's incentive percentage and withhold percentage. The statistics
reported are for scal year 2005. Each cell contains of mean and standard error, which are
calculated using bootstrap.
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Table 1.17: Summary of hospital characteristics by the performance in the HVBP program - Incentive
payment measured in percentage change
(1) (2) (1)-(2) (3) (4) (3) - (4) (1) - (3)
Big Small Big Small
winners winners losers losers
Teaching Status 0.23 0.36 -0.13 0.44 0.38 0.07 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
For prot 0.37 0.31 0.06 0.40 0.40 0.00 -0.11
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Urban 0.38 0.25 0.13 0.17 0.22 -0.05 -0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
No. of beds (100s) 1.60 2.63 -1.03 3.27 2.96 0.31 0.03
(0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.14)
No. of nurses(1000s) 1.93 4.07 -2.14 3.97 4.71 -0.74 0.80
(0.12) (0.85) (0.87) (0.14) (1.32) (1.37) (1.21)
Share of low income patients 0.13 0.15 -0.02 0.20 0.18 0.02 -0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Share of Medicare days 0.39 0.38 0.01 0.35 0.37 -0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
No. of discharges 0.60 1.08 -0.48 1.24 1.14 0.10 0.14
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Note: Big winners (losers) are dened as HVBP hospitals that earn (lose) higher than the fty
percentile of payment of the winning (losing) group. The third colum is the dierence between
column1 and column 2. Column 6 is the dierence between column 3 and column 4. Column 7 is
the dierence between column 1 and column 4. Each cell has a column of two statistics, mean and
standard variation.
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Table 1.18: Placebo Test for DID Analysis of HCAHPS measures - Placebo time of intervention:
2010
Nurse Doctor Respon- Pain Medicine Clean- Discharge Hospital
Comn Comn siveness Mngn Comn ness Info Rating
Post10 1.1∗∗∗ 0.7∗∗∗ 1.1∗∗∗ 0.9∗∗∗ 2.2∗∗∗ 0.6∗∗ 1.6∗∗∗ 1.8∗∗∗
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
HVBP*Post10 0.3 -0.4∗ 0.0 -0.1 -0.9∗∗ 0.8∗∗∗ -0.3 0.3
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
Ownership 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 -0.3 -0.3
(0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.2) (0.4)
Teaching status 0.6∗ 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.2
(0.3) (0.2) (0.4) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (0.3)
No. of beds 0.2 0.2 0.3∗ 0.2∗ -0.1 0.2 0.3∗ 0.5∗∗
(100s) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1) (0.2)
No. of nurses 0.0 0.0∗ 0.1∗∗ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
(100s) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Share of -6.4∗∗∗ -1.3 -6.5∗∗ -3.1 -4.0 -4.8∗∗ -5.4∗∗∗ -9.2∗∗∗
Medicare days (1.8) (1.6) (2.5) (2.2) (2.5) (1.8) (1.6) (2.4)
R2 0.87 0.88 0.90 0.80 0.80 0.89 0.86 0.90
Observations 10255 10255 10255 10255 10255 10255 10255 10255
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include HBVP xed eect, state xed eects
and hospital xed eects, and use cluster variance at hospital level.
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Table 1.19: Updated DID Analysis of HCAHPS measures - Policy intervention in 2009
Nurse Doctor Respon- Pain Medicine Clean- Discharge Hospital
Comn Comn siveness Mngn Comn ness Info Rating
Post09 2.5∗∗∗ 1.3∗∗∗ 2.7∗∗∗ 1.7∗∗∗ 3.8∗∗∗ 1.4∗∗∗ 4.0∗∗∗ 4.1∗∗∗
(0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (0.3)
HVBP*Post09 1.1∗∗∗ -0.1 0.7∗ 0.1 -0.1 1.5∗∗∗ -0.2 0.5
(0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (0.3)
Ownership -0.4∗ -0.2 -0.7∗∗ -0.2 -0.4∗ -0.1 -0.2 -0.6∗
(0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3)
Teaching status 0.4∗ 0.1 0.7∗∗ 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3∗ 0.7∗∗
(0.2) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
No. of beds 0.4∗∗∗ 0.2∗ 0.4∗∗ 0.2∗∗ 0.3∗∗ 0.1 0.4∗∗∗ 0.4∗∗
(100s) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
No.of nurses 0.0∗ 0.0 0.0∗∗ 0.0 0.0∗∗ 0.0∗∗ 0.0∗∗∗ 0.0∗∗∗
(100s) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Share of -10.0∗∗∗ -1.8∗ -11.9∗∗∗ -5.5∗∗∗ -11.2∗∗∗ -5.4∗∗∗ -14.1∗∗∗ -12.2∗∗∗
Medicare days (1.0) (0.8) (1.2) (1.1) (1.2) (1.1) (1.0) (1.3)
No.of -0.7∗ -0.2 -0.6 -0.3 -0.9∗ -0.6 -1.6∗∗ -0.4
discharges (0.3) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.4) (0.3) (0.5) (0.3)
(10,000s)
R2 0.98 0.81 0.83 0.67 0.68 0.79 0.69 0.84
Observations 24083 24083 24082 24079 24069 24083 24080 24083
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include HBVP xed eect, state xed eects
and hospital xed eects, and use cluster variance at hospital level.
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Table 1.20: Impact of HVBP on Clinical outcome measures - DID Analysis with heterogeneity
Heart Attack Mortality Heart Failure Mortality Pneumonia Mortality
After HVBP -0.588 0.847∗∗∗ -0.588
(0.532) (0.199) (0.532)
HVBP * After HVBP -2.614 0.188 -2.614
(1.722) (0.908) (1.722)
Ownership -0.745 0.331 -0.745
(0.738) (0.289) (0.738)
Teaching status -1.295∗∗ 0.335 -1.295∗∗
(0.458) (0.492) (0.458)
Number of beds 1.196 -1.290∗∗ 1.196
(100s) (0.922) (0.491) (0.922)
Number of nurses 0.382 0.166 0.382
(100s) (0.660) (0.576) (0.660)
Share of 1.927 0.706 1.927
Medicare days (2.807) (1.289) (2.807)
Number of discharges -0.745 0.903 -0.745
(10,000s) (1.823) (0.968) (1.823)
HVBP*Post11*Ownership 0.428 0.492 0.428
(0.568) (0.329) (0.568)
HVBP*Post11*Teaching 1.139 -0.225 1.139
(0.574) (0.526) (0.574)
HVBP*Post11*No. of Beds 0.242 0.003 0.242
(0.370) (0.366) (0.370)
HVBP*Post11*No. of Nurses -0.213 0.125 -0.213
(0.665) (0.525) (0.665)
HVBP*Post11*Medicare 3.293 -0.223 3.293
share (2.509) (1.390) (2.509)
HVBP*Post11s -0.622 -0.588 -0.622
*No. of discharges (1.200) (1.059) (1.200)
R2 0.710082 0.585276 0.710082
Observations 215 547 215
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include HBVP xed eect, state xed eects
and hospital xed eects, and use cluster variance at hospital level.
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Table 1.21: Placebo Test for DID Analysis for Clinical outcome measures: Placebo policy in 2010
Heart Attack Mortality Heart Failure Mortality Pneumonia Mortality
Post10 -0.4∗∗∗ 0.2∗∗∗ -0.4∗∗∗
(0.1) (0.0) (0.1)
HVBP*Post10 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0
(0.1) (0.0) (0.1)
Ownership 0.0 -0.0 0.0
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Teaching status 0.1 0.1 0.1
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Number of beds -0.1 0.0 -0.1
(100s) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Number of nurses -0.0 -0.0 -0.0
(100s) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Share of 2.1∗∗∗ -1.3∗∗∗ 2.1∗∗∗
Medicare days (0.6) (0.3) (0.6)
R2 0.82 0.84 0.82
Observations 7810 10982 7810
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include HBVP xed eect, state xed eects
and hospital xed eects, and use cluster variance at hospital level.
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Chapter 2
Relative importance of nancial
incentive vs quality and cost
information in demand side policies
2.1 Introduction
Spending on health care services in the United States has grown rapidly over the past decades. Policy
makers, large employers and insurers have made eorts to address cost growth without reduction
in the quality of and the access to care. One approach to addressing cost growth is to exposing
consumers with insurance to greater proportion of the full price for health care services. Examples
of such approach is high-deductible insurance plans and tiered insurance plans (Brot-Goldberg et al.,
2017; Trivedi et al., 2010). The other approach is to make price variations more transparent and to
encourage patients to search on price transparency tools for high-value care providers (Whaley et al.,
2014; Brown, 2019; Desai et al., 2017, 2016; Lieber, 2017) . While the individual impacts of these
eorts have been documented, there is a lack of evidence on their relative eects. In this paper,
I examine the relative importance of these two approaches in changing patients' choice towards
higher-valued care.
I exploit the reference pricing (RP) initiative by CalPERS and Anthem Blue Cross (BC) starting
from January 2012. This policy is a response to the observations that the outpatient service
prices vary signcantly across regions and even within local markets in California, which can
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not be fully explained by variations in quality and costs. CalPERS and BC made it clear for
patients that for some outpatient procedures, such as arthroscopy, colonoscopy, and cataract removal
procedures, ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) and hospital outpatient departments (HOPDs)
provide comparable quality while ambulatory surgery centers are usually much cheaper. They also
changed signicantly the cost-sharing for patients who choose to go to HOPDs for those procedures,
while keeping that for patients who choose to go ASCs the same.
In order to understand the magnitude of the nancial incentive's impacts relative to the qual-
ity/cost information's impacts, I conduct two analyses. First, applying a dierence-in-dierences
(DID) analysis on the medical claim data of CalPERS BC enrollees from 2008 to 2015, I estimate
the impact of the RP program on facility choice of patients with the procedures subject to this
program. The control group includes patients whose procedures are not covered by the RP and
also not closely related to RP procedures. I nd that relative to patients with the control group
procedures, the probability of patients with RP procedures selecting an ASC after the RP program
increased by 30.4%. I also estimate the RP program's spillover impact on facility choice of patients
with procedures that are not covered by the RP but are related to RP procedures. The probability
of patients with these procedures choosing an ASC increased by 22.5% after the program was
implemented, in comparison for the control group procedures. The presence of the large spillover
eect from the RP program to the patients who were not nancially aected by it indicates the
importance of the information on quality and cost that CalPERS and BC provided for their enrollees.
Second, I estimate nested logit demand models using the claim data samples before and after the
RP program in order to examine the changes in patients' preference as well as patient's perception of
ASCs' and HOPDs' quality. Focusing on patients with colonoscopy in the four most populated health
service areas in California, I nd that patients are more sensitive to the out-of-pocket payment after
the RP program, and less sensitive to the distance to facility as well as the t between facility type
and their health risk. The estimated facility xed-eects also reveal that after the RP program, the
perception of HOPDs'quality drops signicantly while the perception of ASCs' quality stays largely
the same. I also use the pre-RP demand parameters to predict the market shares of ASCs and
HOPDs when only nancial incentives are changed, or when both nancial incentives and quality
information are both provided. This exercise attributes the change in patient behavior seen in the
DID estimation to the nancial incentive component and the information component of the RP
program. I nd that when holding preference parameters and perception of quality the same, the
cost-sharing change implied by the RP program only explains 15.9% of the total change in patients
choice. The change in perception of quality from the pre-RP levels to the post-RP levels explains
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additionally 71.1% of the total change. The remained part of the patient behavior change might
be attributed to the changes in the demand parameters. This exercise highlights the importance
of quality and cost information provision in any eorts that aims at making healthcare consumers
more price sensitive.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes details of the outpatient service industry and
the reference pricing program. Section 3 presents the dierence-in-dierences estimation results.




Changes in clinical technology and organizational capabilities permit an ever-increasing share of
surgical and diagnostic procedures to be done as ambulatory rather than inpatient services. Hospitals
have responded by developing outpatient departments that provide these services, but they face
competition from ASCs. ASCs tend to treat lower risk patients at lower costs (MedPAC, 2017a;
GAO, 2006; MedPAC, 2016), and have lower wait time and procedure time (Grisel and Arjmand,
2009; Munnich and Parente, 2014; Munnich and Richards, 2018; Robert and Courtemanche, 2011;
Paquette et al., 2008). HOPDs tend to treat more risky, medically complex patients because they
are better equipped to handle complications and emergencies (MedPAC, 2016).
The prices for procedures provided in HOPDs are typically much higher than those charged in
ASCs because of the hospitals' higher costs and stronger bargaining position with insurers. Figure
1 shows the degree of price variations in the cataract removal procedure in California during the
2008-2015 period. The risk-adjusted price varies signicantly from below $2000 to above $10,000.
Moreover, while the price of this procedure at ASCs centers around just below $2000, the price of
the same procedure at HOPDs is on average much higher, at around $6000.
2.2.2 Reference Pricing
Recognizing the large price variations, CalPERS and Anthem Blue Cross (BC) initiated a reference
pricing program in order to help keep out-of-pocket costs down, while giving patients access to
quality care (Cross, 2012). There are two component of this initiave: (1) increase cost-sharing for
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patients at expensive care providers, (2) educate enrollees on the relative cost and quality of ASCs
and HOPDs.
Since January 2012, CalPERS and BC provides a value-based insurance for colonoscopy, arthroscopy,
and cataract surgery, in which t maxmium benet for each rocedure in an outpatient hospital setting
are $1500 for colonoscopy, $2000 for cataract surgery, and $6000 for arthroscopy, respectively. If
patients use an ambulatory surgery center or an outpatient hospital that provides these surgeries
within the maximum benet, patients will not have extra costs beyond the deductible and coinsur-
ance. If patients use any outpatient hospital or ambulatory surgery center that charges above the
maximum benet, patients will have to pay the dierence in cost, in addition to the deductible and
coinsurance.
CalPERS and Anthem BC also made it clear that (1) within the same area, these procedures
can be up to three times more expensive in an outpatient hospital than in an ambulatory surgery
center, and (2) data shows that services at ambulatory surgery center are generally the same as in
the outpatient hospital setting, and the average cost in an ambulatory surgery center is lower than
in an outpatient hospital setting.
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2.3 The eects of the reference pricing program on patients'
facility choice
2.3.1 Empirical strategy and Data
To examine the impacts of the reference pricing on patients' facility choice, I conduct a dierence-in-
dierences analysis using CalPERS medical claim data from 2008 to 2015. The variable of interest is
the probability of a patient choosing an ASC when in need of an outpatient procedure. I analyze the
trends of this variable for dierent procedure groups for 4 years prior and 4 years subsequent to the
implementation of reference pricing payments. The treatment group includes CalPERS BC enrolless
who undertook arthroscopy, colonoscopy and cataract removal procedures, which are subject to the
reference pricing initiative.
The control group procedures should satisfy two selection criteria. First, the control group
procedures should be the outpatient procedures which both ASCs and HOPDs have signicant
market shares. Second, the control group procedures should not be closely related to the procedures
under the reference pricing because the information on quality and cost provided in the RP program
might aect the choice of patients with the closely related procedures even if they are not aected
nancially. The selected procedures are skin related diseases (CPT codes 1004019499), hemic
related diseases (CPT codes 3810038999), urinary related diseases (CPT codes 5001053899),
maternity related dieases (CPT codes 5400055899, 5592055980, 5640558999, 5900059899), en-
docrine related diseases (CPT codes 6000060699). The regression of interest is given by
ASCitm = β0RPi + β12012t + β2RPi × 2012t + βXXitm + dt + dm + eitm (2.1)
where ASCitm is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if patient i at time t in market area m selects
ASC, RPi is a dummy for patient i undertaking an arthroscopy, a colonoscopy, or cataract removal
procedure, 2012t is a dummy for the year in or after 2012. Xitm includes patient characteristics
such as age, white, gender, Charlson index. I also include year dummies dt for every year between
2008 and 2015 and market area dummies dm. The parameter of interest is β2, which represents the
change in the probability of a patient with a RP procedure choosing an ASC from before to after
the RP program, relative to that of a patient without RP procedures.
I also examine the demand for ASCs of patients who undertake procedures that are not covered
by the RP but are closely related to RP procedures. This is because of the potential spillover eect of
the RP on the procedures outside the program. These procedures include musculoskeletal procedures
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(CPT codes 2000029999), digestive procedures (CPT codes 4049049999), eye procedures (CPT
codes 6509168899). The DID regression is given by
ASCitm = β0RelatedRPi + β12012t + β2RelatedRPi × 2012t + βXXitm + dt + dm + eitm (2.2)
where RelatedRPi is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if patient i undertakes a procedure that
is related to RP procedures but are not directly impacted by the RP program. The parameter of
interest is β2, which represents the change in the probability of a patient with a related RP procedure
choosing ASC from before to after the RP program, relative to that of a patient with one of control
group procedures.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics of the RP procedures, the related RP procedures, and the procedures
in the control group
No. procedures No. procedures 2008-2011 Average price 2008-2011
2008-2011 2012-2015 HOPD ASC HOPD ASC
RP procedures
Arthroscopy 2986 5183 3171 4998 6754 3757
Cataract Removal 2024 3721 1306 4439 5994 1864
Colonoscopy 15085 23293 14107 24271 2636 947
Related RP procedures
Musculoskeletal diseases 5994 15083 12367 8710 4325 3344
Digestion diseases 9688 16766 14319 12135 4395 1418
Eye diseases 1537 2878 1796 2619 4857 1214
Control group procedures
Skin diseases 5467 12235 13873 3829 3418 2013
Hemic diseases 729 993 1554 168 5454 2165
Urinary diseases 1951 3103 3926 1128 4552 3215
Maternity diseases 1693 3516 4966 243 1533 1831
Endocrine disease 255 308 527 36 5107 4029
The main dataset used for the DID analysis is the outpatient claim data of CalPERS Anthem
Blue Cross enrollees from 2008 to 2015. The unit of observation in this data set is at the procedure
level. Each observation contains limited demographic information about patients (such as age, race,
zip code, diagnosis, etc.), limited information about the procedure performed (procedure codes), and
identifying information about the facilities and the facility types where the procedure was performed.
Table 1 provides summary statistics of RP procedures, related RP procedures and procedures
in the control group. Colonoscopy is the most popular procedure among all common outpatient
procedures. The market shares of HOPD and ASC varies across dierent procedure groups. For
example, while colonoscopy is predominantly performed in ASCs, musculoskeletal procedures are
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Year
Arthroscopy Cataract Removal
Colonoscopy Skin related diseases
Hemic related diseases Urinary related diseases
Maternity related diseases Endoctrine related diseases
Patients choice before and after RP
more commonly performed at HOPDs. Finally, the out-of-pocket payment at HOPDs are signi-
cantly higher than those at ASCs for all outpatient procedures.
2.3.2 Impact on facility choice of patients with RP procedures
Figure 1 shows the trends of the proportion of patients with RP procedures and control group
procedures choosing ASCs. The trends are normalized by the 2008 values. As shown clearly, the
proportion of patients choosing ASCs when in need of RP procedures increased signicantly after
the implementation of the RP program, relative to that of patients who choose ASCs with one of the
control group procedures. Figure 1 also shows that the pre-2011 trends in the proportion of patients
choosing ASCs are largely the same among RP procedures and control group procedures, satisfying
the parallel trends assumption of the DID analysis. This observation is conrmed by placebo tests
that assume the date of the RP to be January 2009 and January 2010. The results are reported in
Appendix 2..1
Table 2 presents the estimation result of the DID regression in (2.1). The estimated coecient
β1 suggests that the probability of a patients with RP procedures choosing ASCs increased 30.4%
after the RP, relative to the patients who undertake the procedures in the control group. .
45




RPi × 2012t 0.304*** (0.004)
Agei 0.002*** (0.000)
Malei -0.005*** (0.001)






Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2.3.3 Spillover impact on facility choice of patients with related RP pro-
cedures
Figure 2 graphs the trends of the proportion of patients who choose ASCs when in need of the pro-
cedures that are closely related to RP procedures but not subject to the RP, such as musculoskeletal
procedures, digestive procedures, and eye procedures. It shows that even though patients who
undertake these procedures are not directly impacted by the RP program nancially, a signicantly
higher proportion of patients chooses ASCs after the RP program, relative to patients who needs
procedures that are not related to RP procedures. These trends indicates a spillover eect that the
RP program has over the related procedures. What might explain this spillover eect is that in
the implementation of this RP program, CalPERS and Anthem BC made it clear of the relative
quality and cost of the choices faced by their enrolles. Although the program only applied to three
procedures in 2012, the relative quality and cost of facilities might apply to other procedures and
that can induce the change in patients' facility choice shown in Figure 2.
Table 2 shows the estimation results of the regression (2.2). The main parameter of interest is
the coecient of the interaction term between RelatedRPi and 2012t. This coecient suggests that
the proportion of the patients who are in need of related RP procedures and choose ASCs increased
by 22.5% after the RP program, relative to that of the patients who have the procedures that are
not closely related to RP procedures. This increase is smaller than the increase in the ASC market
share among patients who undertake RP procedures, but suggests a signicant spillover eect of the
information that CalPERS and Anthem Blue Cross provided has on patients' choice.
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RelatedRPi × 2012t 0.225*** (0.005)
Agei 0.002*** (0.000)
Malei -0.012*** (0.002)






Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.4 Decomposing the demand response into nancial incen-
tive's eects and quality/cost information's eects
2.4.1 Empirical strategy and Data
Section 3 shows that Reference Pricing has signicant impacts on not only patients with RP
procedures but also those with procedures related to RP procedures but not eected by the RP
program. The potential explanation for this spillover eect is the information that CalPERS and
Anthem BC provided enrollees on the relative quality and costs of ASCs and HOPDs.
In order to understand better the relative importance of information and nancial incentive on
patients' behavior, I examine the change in patients' perception of quality of ASCs and HOPDs
before 2012 and after 2012. A measure of perceived quality is constructed from a demand model of
patients' facility choice. I also perform a counterfactual analysis that predicts the demand pattern
when only the cost-sharing changes, holding demand parameters and perception of the ASCs and
HOPDs the same, and when both perception and cost-sharing changes as implied by the RP.
I specify patients' demand for an outpatient facilities with a nested logit model. Patient pref-
erences depend on the out-of-pocket payment, distances, patient characteristics and facility types.
Interactions between patient characteristics and facility type are included to allow coecients to
vary over the population along observable patient characteristic dimensions. For example, sicker
patients may prefer HOPDs since they have emergency rooms, while healthier patients may be more
willing to visits ASCs. The nested logit structure allows for the correlation between the preferences
for facilities within the same type.
Formally, let i denote patient, g denote facility group, g ∈ {A,H}, and j denote a facility in each
group. Patient utility is given by
uijg = −λOOPijg + αjg +Xijgdgβ + (1− σ) εijg
where OOPijg is the out-of-pocket payment and dg is facility type g's xed-eect. Xijg is a set of
patient's characteristics, such as log(incomei), agei, genderi, and distanceijg. σ is the dissimilarity
parameter that indicates the correlation in patients' preferences for facilities within the same facility
group. αjg is the facility jg's xed eect, which is interpreted as the unobserved quality perceived
by patients. I estimate this demand model using the data from 2008 to 2011 and the data from 2012
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to 2015 to compare examine the change in the perceived quality of ASCs and HOPDs as well as the
demand parameters from before the RP to after the RP.
The main dataset used for the demand estimation is a subset of the CalPER outpatient claim. I
forcused on the most common outpatient procedure, colonoscopy, and on the Health Special Areas
Golden Empire, North, West and East Bay, which are most populated in California1. The unit of
observation in this data set is at the procedure level. Each observation contains limited demographic
information about patients (such as age, race, zip code, diagnosis, etc.), limited information about
the procedure performed (procedure codes), and identifying information about the facilities and the
facility types where the procedure was performed.
Table 2.4: Summary statistics of patient characteristics in the demand estimation
2008-2011 2012-2015
ASC HOPD ASC HOPD
Out-of-pocket cost 912.445 2733.633 1506.268 3019.755
(752.317) (1656.860) (982.699) (2065.804)
Distance 12.570 14.032 13.164 14.436
(7.964) (9.907) (9.192) (8.489)
Charlson index 0.014 0.092 0.010 0.052
(0.188) (0.506) (0.194) (0.266)
Age 57.052 56.289 56.084 56.593
(7437) (8.779) (9.292) (9.793)
Median income 79,787.39 72,523.69 76,614.79 71,218.98
(27,931.66) (18,426.96) (23,438.74) (17,159.38)
Female 0.525 0.563 0.548 0.577
(0.499) (0.496) (0.497) (0.495)
No. Observations 478 1346 1238 381
From this dataset, I compute several variables to include in the demand estimation. First,
I compute the distance between patients and facilities. Patients' locations are identied using a
5-digit zip code; for facilities, exact addresses are available. Using the longitudes and latitudes of
patient zip code's centroid and facility addresses, I calculate the travel distance as the straight line
between two points. Second, I derive the Charlson co-morbidity index from each patient's diagnosis
to proxy for that patient's health risk. Third, I link the claim dataset with the American Community
Survey to obtain the median household income of a given patient's zip code.
The demand estimation also requires a measure of out-of-pocket (OOP) payments. In order to
compute this variable, I sum the out-of-pocket costs for all the procedures performed on the same
day as the main procedure, for example, anesthesia, durable medical equipment, implants, etc. In
this sense, out-of-pocket payments are the amount patients are responsible for during the whole
outpatient treatment episode. This is in line with how Medicare structures its payment for HOPDs
1https://www.dartmouthatlas.org/faq/
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and ASCs procedures, that is, as the whole package of services during each visit, including both
main procedure and auxiliary services (MedPAC, 2016, 2017b). In addition, the demand estimation
requires the out-of-pocket payment for the facilities that were available in patient's choice set but
not chosen. This variable is not readily available. I predict this variable from a regression that
regresses the out-of-pocket payment on patients characteristics and facility type and facility specic
eects.
Table 4 summarizes patient characteristics by facility type for the periods before and after the
Reference Pricing program. Statistics for ASC patients are listed in the columns 2 and 4 while
statistics for HOPD patients are listed in the columns 3 and 5. The most striking dierences
between ASC patients and HOPD patients are in out-of-pocket payments and Charlson comorbidity
index. The average out-of-pocket payment at HOPDs is signicantly higher than that at ASCs, for
both the years before and after the RP policy. Patients who go to HOPDs also have substantially
higher risk than patients who go ASCs. Other characteristics such as age, gender and distance also
show dierences among ASC and HOPD patients, although the dierences are small.
2.4.2 Demand estimation results
Estimates from the nested logit demand model provide insight into consumers' facility choice deci-
sions. Table 5 displays the estimation results from the nested logit demand for the periods before
and after the RP program.
Table 2.5: Demand estimates before and after the RP
Before the RP, 2008-2011 After the RP, 2012-2015
Coe Std. error Coe Std. error
Out-of-pocket cost -1.104*** (0.004) -1.259*** (0.208)
Distance -0.142*** (0.009) -0.095*** (0.007)
Age * Facility Type -0.007 (0.010) -0.001 (0.007)
Median Income * Facility Type -0.255 (0.349) 0.086 (0.269)
Female * Facility Type 0.379 (0.168) 0.185 (0.132)
Charlson index * Facility Type 1.534*** (0.437) 0.679 *** (0.271)
Dissimilarity paramters 1.012 (0.069) 0.726 (0.059)
Observations 1,824 1,619
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
First, the pre-RP and post-RP demand estimation results both show that patients' facility choice
depends signicantly on out-of-pocket payment, distance and patient health risk. Notably, the
positive coecients of the interaction term between Charlson index and facility type dummy indicates
that higher Charlson index patients, i.e., patients with higher health risks, are less likely to visit
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ASC's. This result reects the dierence in Charlson index among ASCs' and HOPDs' patients seen
in the summary statistics.
Second, the estimation results show some interesting changes in the sensitiveness of patients
choice with respect to OOP, distance and the t between facility type and patients' health risk. For
example, after the RP program, patients are more sensitive to the out-of-pocket payments than they
were before the program. For a patient having a colonoscopy, to have the out-of-pocket payment
lower by 10 dollars, he/she were willing to travel extra 77.746 miles before the RP, but 132.526
miles after the RP. Comparing the pre-RP and post-RP coecients of the distance variable and
the interaction term Charlson index ∗ Facility Type, patients seem to sort less on the health risk
dimension and the distance dimension, and more on the out-of-pocket dimension after the program.
Turning to the quality of ASCs and HOPDs as perceived by patients, I nd that while the
perceived quality of ASCs do not change, the perceived quality of HOPDs drops signicantly after
the RP program. Figure 3 scatter plots the perceived quality of all facilities in the sample before
and after RP.
2.4.3 Decomposing the importance of co-sharing and information changes
Subsection (2.4.2) shows the changes after the RP in patients' sensitiveness to the out-of-pocket
payment, distance and their heatlth risk, as well as the changes in patients' perception of ASCs and
HOPDs quality. In this section I decompose the overall changes in patients' behavior into the part
that is due to cost-sharing changes and the part that is due to changes in perception of ASCs and
HOPDs' quality. To do so, I predict the market share of ASCs when only the cost-sharing changes
holding xed patients' preference parameters and patients' perception, and when the cost-sharing
as well as patients' perception change while the parameters are the same.
The results are reported in Table 6. For conoloscopy patients, ASC market share increased by
50.2% after the RP program (from 26.2% to 76.4%). Holding the preference parameters and the
quality perception constant, the cost-sharing increase in HOPDs as imposed by the RP program
increases ASC market share by only 8%. However, when allowing the quality perception to change
from the level before the RP to the level after RP, the ASC market share increases by 43.7%.
This means that changes in perception of ASCs and HOPDs quality explain 71.1% of the changes in
patients' favor of ASCs ((43.7%-8%)/50.2%), and while the cost-sharing changes only explain 15.9%.
This counterfactual exercise hightlights the importance of quality and cost transparency in patients'
choice and in the eectiveness of policies that aim to make patients more price-sensitive.
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Mean (Std.error) Mean (Std.error)
Perceived ASC quality -0.667 (0.410) -0.739 (0.486) -0.073 (0.614)
Perceived HOPD quality 1.985 (0.331) -1.945 (0.237) -3.931*** (0.413)
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ASCs Market share 0.262 0.764 0.342 0.689
Change in ASC Market




In this paper I examine the relative importance of nancial incentive and quality and cost information
in changing healthcare consumers' facility choice by exploiting the reference pricing (RP) program
implemented by the California Public Employee's Retirement System.
I nd that the program led to a 30.4% increase in the demand for low-cost ambulatory surgery
centers (ASCs) among patients who need the procedures covered by RP. The program also led
to a 22.6% increase in the demand for ASCs among patients who need procedures related to RP
procedures but are not directly impacted by the RP nancially. The presence of the large spillover
eect suggests the importance of the cost/quality information that RP provided patients with.
Furthermore, the demand estimation pre-RP and post-RP shows that patients are more sensitive
to price and less sensitive to distance and their health risk after the RP. Their perception of HOPDs'
quality dropped signicantly while that of ASCs' quality stay the same. I estimate that the nancial
incentive change in the RP program explains about 15.9% of the total demand change, while the
change in patient's perception of facility quality contribute about 71.1%.
These results imply that while policies such as increased cost-sharing can improve patients' choice
toward higher-valued care, quality and cost transparency is critical for those policies to make greater
impacts on patients' behavior.
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Appendix
2..1 Placebo test for the DID regressions
Table 2.7: Placebo test regression estimation results, using the two placebo years 2010, and 2011
ASCit Placebo year 2010 Placebo year 2011
Coecient Std.error Coecient Std.error
RelatedRPi 0.206*** (0.005) 0.203*** (0.004)
After2010t -0.054*** (0.003)
RelatedRPi ×After2010t 0.003 (0.007)
After2011t -0.035*** (0.003)
RelatedRPi ×After2011t 0.015* (0.008)
Agei 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000)
Malei 0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003)
Charlson indexi -0.033*** (0.001) -0.034*** (0.001)
Constant 0.056*** (0.009) 0.038*** (0.009)
Observations 79,895 79,895
R-squared 0.182 0.179
Year FE YES YES
HSA FE YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.8: Placebo test regression estimation results, using the two placebo years 2010, and 2011 -
Spillover eects
ASCit Placebo year 2010 Placebo year 2011
Coecient Std.error Coecient Std.error
RelatedRPi 0.139*** (0.006) 0.141*** (0.004)
After2010t -0.056*** (0.004)
RelatedRPi ×After2010t 0.023*** (0.007)
After2011t -0.006 (0.004)
RelatedRPi ×After2011t 0.035* (0.008)
Agei 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000)
Malei 0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003)
Charlson indexi -0.027*** (0.001) -0.027*** (0.001)
Constant 0.037*** (0.009) -0.011*** (0.010)
Observations 59,800 59,800
R-squared 0.130 0.130
Year FE YES YES
HSA FE YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 3
Public Price Setting with Insurance:
The case of Medicare policies for the
outpatient market
3.1 Introduction
Governments in the U.S. and many countries set reimbursement rates for healthcare services that
are covered by public insurance. In some cases, the reimbursement rate depends on where the
service is provided. For example, in the US, Medicare sets reimbursement rates of approximately
$2600 for a shoulder joint replacement procedure performed at a hospital and $1300 for the same
procedure provided at a surgery center. Medicare also species that patients are responsible for
20% of the reimbursement rates for all outpatient procedures across all care settings. Because
Medicare beneciaries do not face the full costs of treatments, they have limited incentives to avoid
high-cost options. This paper examines how Medicare can jointly optimize reimbursement rates and
coinsurance rates on outpatient procedures to induce patients to choose high net value care facilities
while also protecting patients from nancial risks.
Both the volume of outpatient procedures and Medicare's spending on them have increased
signicantly over the past decade (MedPAC, 2017a), largely due to technological advancements
that allow more procedures to be performed safely in outpatient settings. The two main types
of providers in the U.S. outpatient care market are hospital outpatient departments (HOPDs) and
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ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs). They compete over many outpatient procedures, where patients
are typically discharged on the same day as the treatment. ASCs tend to treat lower risk patients at
lower costs (MedPAC, 2017a; GAO, 2006; MedPAC, 2016), and have lower wait time and procedure
time (Grisel and Arjmand, 2009; Munnich and Parente, 2014; Munnich and Richards, 2018; Robert
and Courtemanche, 2011; Paquette et al., 2008). HOPDs tend to treat more risky, medically complex
patients because they are better equipped to handle complications and emergencies (MedPAC, 2016).
Medicare uses dierent reimbursement systems for ASCs and HOPDs. Under current policy, the
same outpatient procedure is reimbursed at a signicantly higher rate when performed in HOPDs
than in ASCs because hospitals must meet additional regulatory requirements and treat patients who
are more medically complex (MedPAC 2003). However, the reimbursement dierentials observed
in practice may be too large to be justied by the variations in costs and in the quality of care
between HOPDs and ASCs. Examining whether this is the case is challenging because of the lack
of data on cost and quality of care at ASCs. Wynn et al. (2008) provides suggestive evidence that
dierences in payments exceed the dierences in costs. In addition, a few studies suggest that ASCs
and HOPDs deliver comparable health outcomes for low risk patients (Grisel and Arjmand, 2009;
Robinson and Brown, 2013; Robinson et al., 2015a,c). These ndings suggest that Medicare might
be spending excessively on outpatient care performed in hospitals, especially for low risk patients.
Since Medicare is mostly nanced through taxation, this overspending is inecient and can lead to
signicant dead weight losses. But simply reducing the reimbursement rates for HOPDs might not
be the answer because patients bear a xed proportion of these costs (determined by the coinsurance
rate), and high reimbursement rates for HOPDs might incentivize patients to choose ASCs, which
provide comparable quality of care at lower costs. What the optimal reimbursement rates are for
HOPDs and ASCs depend in part on the coinsurance rate faced by Medicare beneciaries, and this
question has not been studied both theoretically and empirically.
In recent years, stakeholders have shown increasing interest in restructuring the reimbursement
rates for outpatient procedures at HOPDs and ASCs while recognizing the dierences in costs
and quality across care settings. For example, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, a
non-partisan legislative branch agency providing Congress with advice on the Medicare program,
has recently made a number of recommendations designed to equalize reimbursement rates across
care settings for outpatient services. In 2017, Medicare introduced site-neutral payment policies
that lowered payment to HOPDs to the ASCs' reimbursement rates1. This policy closed the gaps
1The most recent legislation focused on o-campus provider-based sites located 250 yards or more away
from the hospital's campus: https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/nance/12-things-to-know-about-site-neutral-
payments.html
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in reimbursement rates and patients' out-of-pocket payments between HOPDs and ASCs for some
most commonly billed services2. While lowering Medicare spending, these policies might aect the
allocation of patients between HOPDs and ASCs. The net eect of these site-neutral payment
policies on social surplus is largely unclear.
I develop a theoretical model to characterize the optimal reimbursement rates for outpatient
care providers and coinsurance rates for Medicare beneciaries. The optimal reimbursement rates
and coinsurance rates maximize consumer surplus subject to providers' participation constraints
and Medicare's budget constraint. I show that reimbursement rates are optimally set at providers'
marginal costs and coinsurance rates should be higher for the facilities with lower net value, where
net value is dened as the dierence between marginal benet and marginal cost. In practice,
Medicare sets coinsurance rates uniformly across HOPDs and ASCs. To my knowledge, there are
no legal requirements for Medicare to keep the coinsurance rates the same across settings. However,
Medicare might want to do so to reduce complexity in administration, and confusion among its
beneciaries. In scenarios where Medicare is constrained to set uniform coinsurance rates, I show
that the optimal reimbursement rates are instead above marginal costs in order to incentivize better
sorting into higher net value facilities.
In my empirical analysis, I quantify the optimal reimbursement rates and coinsurance rates and
evaluate the welfare impacts if Medicare were to move from its current practice to the optimal policy.
As a rst step, I estimate the marginal costs of care at HOPDs and ASCs. Using nancial data and
cost reports, I estimate the cost functions for HOPDs and ASCs in Pennsylvania. I nd that the
marginal costs of main procedure groups at HOPDs are almost double the marginal costs of those
at ASCs. For both HOPDs and ASCs, the marginal costs are signicantly below current Medicare
reimbursement rates.
I also estimate patients' valuation of care at these two care settings. Using Medicare claim data,
I estimate a nested logit demand model of Medicare beneciaries for outpatient care facilities. I nd
that the patients' facility choice is signicantly responsive to out-of-pocket payments. I also nd
that low-risk patients perceive ASCs to be of higher value than HOPDs whereas high-risk patients
perceive HOPDs to be of higher value than ASCs. Combining the marginal cost and the demand
estimates, I nd that ASCs oer signicantly higher net value than HOPDs for standard procedures,
and similar net value for more complex procedures.
In the counterfactual analyses, I rst predict the welfare impacts of a site-neutral payment policy
where Medicare reduces the HOPD reimbursement rates to the ASC rates. I nd that this policy
2https://revcycleintelligence.com/news/site-neutral-payments-for-hospital-clinic-visits-starting-in-2019
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pushes more patients to HOPDs, where the net value of care is the same or lower for most common
procedure groups, resulting in a decrease in social welfare. I also estimate that when coinsurance
rates are xed at 20%, Medicare would optimally reduce the ASC reimbursement rates to ASCs'
marginal costs, and increase the HOPD reimbursement rates. The resulting shifts in the prices
faced by patients would incentivize sorting into the ASCs, increasing welfare by 3.1% to 6.4% while
reducing Medicare spending on the outpatient market by 9% to 15%. However, when coinsurance
can be set exibly, the optimal reimbursement rates are set at marginal cost levels for both HOPDs
and ASCs, and the coinsurance rate should be set higher for HOPDs. Setting both reimbursement
rates and coinsurance rates optimally allows Medicare to achieve a welfare gain of 3.1% to 6.1%
while reducing the its spending on the outpatient market by 15% to 23%.
This paper ts into the broader literature on optimal health care payment systems. A large
part of this literature studies the dierences in the incentives created by payment schemes such as
cost-based payment, prospective payment, and mixed payment (see for example Ellis and McGuire
(1986), Ellis and McGuire (1990), Ellis and Mcguire (1993)). In this paper, I take as given the
existing prospective payment structure that Medicare implements for ASCs and HOPDs and quantify
the optimal reimbursement rates for the procedures that are performed in both ASCs and HOPDs.
Perhaps most closely related to this paper are the studies of Ellis and McGuire (1990); Ellis and
Mcguire (1993). They point out that the price paid by insured patients can be set separately from
the price paid to providers, implying that demand-side cost sharing and supply-side reimbursement
rates are two distinct strategies for controlling health care costs.
This paper is also related to the literature on optimal insurance design. Conventional theory of
optimal coinsurance rates for health insurance with moral hazard indicates that coinsurance should
vary with the price responsiveness of demand for dierent medical services (Zeckhauser, 1970; Pauly,
1968). Recent discussion of optimal insurance design focuses on the theory of value-based cost
sharing which stipulates that coinsurance should be lower for services with higher benets relative
to costs (Pauly and Blavin, 2008; Chernew et al., 2007). This paper examines reimbursement and
coinsurance structure for healthcare services when there are two provider types with dierent quality
and cost structures.
This paper also contributes to the outpatient care literature. There are four main areas in
this literature: the dierences in quality and costs of ASCs and HOPDs (Wynn et al., 2008;
Avalere Health, 2016; Hollingsworth et al., 2012); the determinants of facility choices (Plotzke and
Courtemanche, 2011; David and Neuman, 2011; Gabel et al., 2008; Weber, 2014); the impacts of
payment policy on competition in this market (Munnich and Richards, 2018); and some discussions
61
of the potential impacts of Medicare's site-neutral payment policy (Cassidy, 2014; Kondamuri et al.,
2019). This paper contributes directly to this literature by proposing the optimal payment policy
for outpatient procedures and comparing the welfare impacts of the proposed optimal policy with
those of the recent Medicare site-neutral payment policy.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a model that characterizes the optimal
reimbursement rates and coinsurance rates. Section 3 describes the data used in the empirical
analysis. Section 4 presents demand estimation strategy and results. Section 5 presents cost function
estimation strategy and results. Section 6 provides the results of the counterfactual analyses. Section
7 concludes.
3.2 Theory
I develop a simple theoretical model to understand how Medicare can set reimbursement rates and
coinsurance rates to balance the allocative eciency and the risk protection benet of insurance.
This model provides the characterization of the optimal policies. It also provides some guidance for
the counterfactual analyses where I compute the optimal policies and the welfare impacts if Medicare
were to implement those policy proposals.
In this model, Medicare sets reimbursement and coinsurance policy in order to maximize con-
sumer surplus subject to patients' rationality, facility participation constraints and Medicare's budget
constraint. The model assumes a demand system where facilities are vertically dierentiated by
their quality and ability to treat patients of dierent risk types. The assumptions allow me to
formulate closed form solution for patients' demand system and simplies the solution for optimal
reimbursement and coinsurance policy. In the empirical analysis, I extend the model into the case
with horizontally dierentiated demand where patients' demand depends not only on facilities'
quality and type, but also on how well they match with patients' health risks and other demographic
characteristics.
I rst introduce notation and set up Medicare's problem. I then discuss the rst order conditions
and the solution. Finally, I provide two comparative statics: (1) the relative magnitude of the optimal
coinsurance rates in the case Medicare can set them exibly, and (2) the optimal reimbursement
rates when the coinsurance rates are xed at an exogenous rate.
Model setup Assume that there are two facilities, hospital and ambulatory surgery center, which
compete over an outpatient procedure, such as a shoulder joint replacement procedure. Let the
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marginal costs of the HOPD and the ASC be cH and cA, respectively. I assume that the procedure
in HOPD is more costly than in ASC, i.e., cH ≥ cA. This is in line with suggestive evidence in
existing literature about ASCs and HOPDs' relative costs, and the cost function estimation results
presented in Subsection 3.5.2.
I also assume that there is a continuum of patients with health risk r, with distribution F (r)
over the unit interval [0, 1]. Patients have the same level of wealth, w. These assumptions allow me
to focus attention on the ecient allocation of patients into the two care settings based on patients'
health risk. Note that the common wealth assumption implies that the risk protection benet of
insurance only varies with the out-of-pocket payments that patients are responsible for. In the
empirical model, patients have variable income levels, which aects patients' facility choice.
With probability p , patients do not need the procedure. They pay premium of φ for the insurance
coverage, and receive utility
u0 = ν (w − φ) (3.1)
where ν (.) is a concave function, reecting the assumption that patients are risk-averse, and w
is patients' wealth. With probability 1 − p, patients need the procedure, and they choose between
HOPD and ASC in order to maximize utility3. Their utility from getting treated at a facility depends
on the facility's quality, their health risk and out-of-pocket payments. Specically, the utility of a
patient with health risk r who receives care at the HOPD and at the ASC are given, respectively,
by
uH = ν (w − φ− bHpH) + αH + βHr (3.2)
uA = ν (w − φ− bApA) + αA + βAr (3.3)
where bH and bA are the coinsurance rates at the HOPD and the ASC, pH and pA are the
reimbursement rates. αH and αA are HOPD's and ASC's xed eects. βH and βA represent
marginal utilities at the HOPD and the ASC when patients' health risk increases incrementally. I
assume βH > βA to reect the stylized fact that marginal utility with respect to risk is higher in
HOPDs and that high risk patients tend to choose HOPDs over ASCs.
Medicare's policy instrument is a vector κ = {pH , pA, bH , bA, φ}. Patients make a facility choice
in order to maximize their utility given Medicare's policy parameters. Given the structure of the
3In this model I assume there is no outside option, so that the theoretical model is consistent with the empirical
analysis where the demand estimation also assumes no outside option. The solution of the model with an outside
option is largely similar. I provide details of the derivations in Appendix 3.7.4
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utility functions, the resulting demand system is given by following a cut-o rule:
Choice =

H if r ≥ rAH = 1βH−βA [ν (w − φ− bApA)− ν (w − φ− bHpH)] +
αA−αH
βH−βA
A if r ≤ rAH
(3.4)
where rAH is the health risk level at which patients are indierent between the ASC and the HOPD.
This cuto gives the demand for HOPD and ASC as QH = 1− F (rAH) and QA = F (rAH). Given





[puA(κ, r) + (1− p)u0] dF (r) +
∫ 1
rAH









φ = p {(1− bH) pHQH + (1− bA) pAQA} (3.7)
pH ≥ cH (3.8)
pA ≥ cA (3.9)
The rst constraint represents patients' incentive compatibility. The second constraint is Medicare's
budget constraint, which says the Medicare's premium has to cover the cost of care remaining after
patients contribute their cost-sharing. In reality, Medicare sets the premium to cover 25% of the
cost of the program, and the remaining 75% is subsidized by Medicare fund. In this model I assume
away this detail with the justication that this subsidization is not likely to aect patients' facility
choice when they need the treatment. Finally, the last two constraints are the HOPD's and ASC's
participation constraints, that is, the Medicare reimbursement rates have to be greater or equal to
facilities' marginal costs.
Solution I now discuss the intuition of the optimal reimbursement and insurance policy. Detailed
derivations are in Appendix 3.7.4. I show that the optimal reimbursement rates are at the providers'
marginal costs, i.e., p∗H = cH , p
∗
A = cA. To understand this, consider the impacts on consumers'
welfare of an increase in HOPD reimbursement rate. An increase in HOPD's reimbursement rate has
a direct impact of increasing out-of-pocket payments for HOPD patients, which decreases HOPD
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patients' utility. It also indirectly aects premium φ in two ways. More expensive procedures in
HOPD require a higher premium. However, more expensive procedures in HOPD also steer patients
away from this provider type to the cheaper ASC, which will reduce the cost of the Medicare program,
and hence reduce premium. Under the assumption that patients' price responsiveness is not too large,
which is the case for demand for most types of health care services, higher reimbursement rates at
HOPD will in net increase premium. This aects not only patients at HOPD but also those at
ASC and those who do not need the treatment. In short, an increase in reimbursement rate lowers
consumer surplus. The optimal reimbursement rate to a facility must therefore be set at the facility's
marginal cost.
I also show that the optimal coinsurance rates solve a system of equations that balance risk
protection benet with allocative eciency. The risk protection benet decreases as coinsurance
rates increase. In contrast, allocative eciency increases as coinsurance rate increases because the
extent of moral hazard is decreasing in coinsurance rates.
I now move to discuss two comparative statics derived from this model. The rst comparative
static compares the magnitude of the optimal coinsurance rates b∗H and b
∗
A. The second comparative
static concerns the optimal reimbursement rates when coinsurance rates can not be set exibly but
are xed at some exogenous level.
Comparative static 1: The optimal HOPD coinsurance rate is higher than the optimal
ASC coinsurance rate, i.e., b∗H > b
∗
A . Combining the FOCs of bH and bA (as provided in









The intuition for this equality is as follows. When coinsurance rates can be set exibly, the optimal
reimbursement rates for HOPD and ASC are set at their marginal costs. Coinsurance rates act as
a steering device that balances the trade-o between risk protection and allocative eciency. The
left-hand side of equation (3.10) is the relative increase in patients' utility when their coinsurance
rates decrease. The right-hand side of this equation is the relative increase in premium when
the coinsurance rates decrease. Recall that premium reects the cost of the Medicare program.
Intuitively, this equality says that coinsurance rates are adjusted so that the relative marginal utility
gain is equal to the relative marginal cost resulted from coinsurance changes.
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In order to provide clearer intuition, I consider the special case where patients are close to
risk-neutral, or where the risk protection benet for HOPD patients is the same as that for ASC
patients. When this is the case, the optimal coinsurance rates only try to achieve allocative eciency.
This allocation eciency is achieved if
bHpH − bApA = cH − cA (3.11)
which says the optimal coinsurance rates are such that the dierence in out-of-pocket payments in
HOPD and ASC is equal to the dierence in their marginal costs. Given HOPD's marginal cost is
higher than ASC's marginal cost, this is achieved when the coinsurance rate at HOPD is set higher
than the coinsurance rate at ASC.
In general, relative magnitude of optimal HOPD's and ASC's coinsurance rates depends on
relative marginal costs, relative marginal value of HOPD and ASC as well as relative risk protection
benets of insurance for HOPD and ASC patients. Relative magnitude of HOPD and ASC coinsur-
ance rates is therefore ambiguous. However, it is possible to show that when HOPD delivers similar
marginal value as ASC at much higher marginal cost, i.e., cH  cA and βH ≈ βA, the optimal
coinsurance rate at HOPD is higher than the optimal coinsurance rate at ASC.
Comparative static 2: Optimal reimbursement rates are higher than marginal costs
when coinsurance rates are xed at an exogenous level. Now I consider the optimal
reimbursement rates when coinsurance rates are set at an exogenous level b̄, e.g., 20% as in current
Medicare policy. Consider again the special case where patients are close to risk-neutral or the
risk protection benet of insurance for ASC patients and HOPD patients are the same. The
optimal allocation is achieved if 0.2 (pH − pA) = cH − cA. It is then clearly no longer optimal
to reimburse HOPD and ASC at the marginal costs. Also recall that consumer surplus is decreasing
in reimbursement rates, implying that one of the two facility participation constraints has to bind.
Therefore, the optimal reimbursement rates would be at marginal cost for ASC, and above marginal
cost for HOPD.
In general case, in order to achieve the same allocation as the optimal allocation under uncon-








As discussed before, p∗A = cA. Therefore, b̄ = b
∗
A. The optimal reimbursement rate for HOPD has
to be increased above its marginal cost.
Empirical model In order to empirically compute the optimal reimbursement and coinsurance
rates and the welfare impacts if Medicare were to move from the current practice to the optimal
policy, I extend the theoretical model in order to incorporate some data features. For example, I
model the market as being composed of two groups of facilities, hospitals and ambulatory surgery
centers, instead of two facilities as in the theoretical model. However, I maintain the assumption
that facilities in each group of facilities share the same marginal cost. In Section 3.5.2 I provide
estimates of marginal costs of outpatient procedure groups in ASCs and HOPDs. The result shows
that, consistent with this assumption, a bulk of variations in marginal costs comes from the variation
across facility types, not within each type.
I also extend the patients' facility demand to include not only their health risk, but also their
demographic characteristics and distance to facilities. These variables are shown in Subsection 3.4.2
to be important to explain patients' facility choice.
The optimal policy solution to this empirical model is provided in Appendix 3.7.5. Because a
closed form demand function is not available in this empirical model, it is not possible to derive
comparative statics. However, the main results from the theoretical model still govern the design of
the optimal reimbursement and coinsurance policy. First, reimbursement rates are optimally be set
at facilities' marginal costs. Second, coinsurance rates are optimally set so that they balance risk
protection and allocative eciency. In the case where the risk protection benet of ASC and HOPD
patients are equal, coinsurance rates act to steer patients to achieve ecient allocation. Medicare
can do so by setting coinsurance rate at HOPDs higher than coinsurance rate at ASCs. In the case
where the risk protection benets are dierent for ASCs patients and HOPD patients, the optimal
coinsurance rate at HOPDs is higher than the optimal coinsurance rate at ASCs if HOPDs provide
the same marginal value of care as ASCs but at much higher marginal costs. Finally, if Medicare
is constrained to set the same coinsurance rates for all facility types at an exogenous rate, then the
optimal reimbursement rates are above facilities' marginal costs.
I now turn to the empirical analysis of the ASCs' and HOPDs' demand and cost functions, and
the computation of optimal policies and their welfare impacts. I start with describing the data used
in the demand and supply estimation in the following section.
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3.3 Data
3.3.1 Data for demand estimation
I model patients' choice by a nested logit demand model where patients' facility choice depends on
patients' characteristics and facilities' characteristics. The main dataset used for demand estimation
is the outpatient claim data of Medicare beneciaries, which covers 20% of all outpatient procedures
performed in Pennsylvania from 2012 to 2015. The unit of observation in this data set is at the
procedure level. Each observation contains limited demographic information about patients (such as
age, race, zip code, diagnosis, etc.), limited information about the procedure performed (procedure
codes), and identifying information about the facilities and the facility types where the procedure
was performed.
From this dataset, I compute several variables to include in the demand estimation. First,
I compute the distance between patients and facilities. Patients' locations are identied using a
5-digit zip code; for facilities, exact addresses are available. Using the longitudes and latitudes of
patient zip code's centroid and facility addresses, I calculate the travel distance as the straight line
between two points. Second, I derive the Charlson co-morbidity index from each patient's diagnosis
to proxy for that patient's health risk. Third, I link the claim dataset with the American Community
Survey to obtain the median household income of a given patient's zip code.
The demand estimation also requires a measure of out-of-pocket (OOP) payments. In order to
compute this variable, I sum the out-of-pocket costs for all the procedures performed on the same
day as the main procedure, for example, anesthesia, durable medical equipment, implants, etc. In
this sense, out-of-pocket payments are the amount patients are responsible for during the whole
outpatient treatment episode. This is in line with how Medicare structures its payment for HOPDs
and ASCs procedures, that is, as the whole package of services during each visit, including both
main procedure and auxiliary services (MedPAC, 2016, 2017b). In addition, the demand estimation
also requires the out-of-pocket payment for the facilities that were available in patient's choice set
but not chosen. This variable is not readily available. However, using the payment schedule set by
Medicare in the Outpatient Prospective Payment System for HOPDs and the Ambulatory Payment
System for ASCs4, I compute what the reimbursement rates are for each outpatient procedure at
each facility given its facility type, and its geographic location.
In summary, the observed patient characteristics included in the demand estimation are age,
sex, race, income, and distance. The observed facility characteristics included are facility xed
4Both payment schedules are published at Center of Medicare and Medicaid Services' website.
68
eects and a facility type dummy, the latter of which is interacted with patient characteristics.
Finally, unlike many existing papers that estimate demand for care of Medicare patients, I include
out-of-pocket payment in the demand analysis. The main reason is that out-of-pocket payment
amounts vary signicantly across facilities in the outpatient care market. As will be shown later
in the demand estimation results, out-of-pocket payment is an important variable that explains
patients' facility demand.
For the computation of the optimal coinsurance rates and reimbursement rates, one will ideally
estimate patients' facility demand for each and every procedure. However, too many outpatient
procedures make this task infeasible. Therefore, in this paper, I focus only on the most common
specialties: gastroenterology and ophthalmology, which together represent 40% of all ASCs in the
US5. In addition, I also include in my analysis musculoskeletal procedures that treat bone/ muscle
disorders - which are some of more medically complex and expensive conditions to treat6.
Patients with traditional Medicare Fee for Service insurance are not subject to restricted networks
of facilities. Therefore, patients' choice set might include all facilities in Pennsylvania. However, to
reduce computation time, I dene patients' choice set as including all facilities which are located in
less than the 90th percentile of all travel distance from the patients' zip code. This results in zip
code specic choice sets.
Table 1 summarizes patient characteristics by facility type. Statistics for ASC patients are listed
in the rst two columns while statistics for HOPD patients are listed in the last two columns.
There are many more gastroenterology procedures and ophthalmology procedure done in ASCs
than in HOPDs. However, more musculoskeletal procedures are performed in HOPDs. Across
specialty groups, the most striking dierences between ASC patients and HOPD patients are in
out-of-pocket payments, Charlson comorbidity index and median household income. Across all
procedures, the average out-of-pocket payment at HOPDs is signicantly higher than that at ASCs.
The dierence ranges widely from around $135 to $250 (70% to 110%). Patients who go to HOPDs
also have substantially higher risk than patients who go ASCs. The summary statistics also show
that ASC patients tend to come from higher median income zip codes than HOPD patients. Other
characteristics such as age, gender, race, and distance also show statistically signicant dierences
among ASC and HOPD patients, although the dierences are economically small.
Among Medicare recipients many pay either zero or little out-of-pocket amounts because they




Table 3.1: Summary statistics of Medicare outpatient patients
ASC HOPD Dierence
Mean Std Mean Std
Gastroenterology procedures
Out-of-pocket cost 129.91 47.81 265.35 234.56 -135.44∗∗∗
Distance 9.21 5.53 9.19 6.13 0.02
Charlson index 0.06 0.32 0.81 1.58 -0.75∗∗∗
Age 71.18 8.52 70.68 11.01 0.50∗∗∗
White 0.91 0.29 0.86 0.35 0.05∗∗∗
Income 83613.83 20409.59 78806.28 21595.73 4807.56∗∗∗
Female 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.04∗∗∗
Observations 11236 10148 21384
Ophthalmology procedures
Out-of-pocket cost 220.05 123.37 370.94 202.31 -150.89***
Distance 11.04 6.76 9.58 6.17 1.46***
Charlson index 0.01 0.16 0.38 0.87 -0.37***
Age 75.36 7.63 75.93 8.37 -0.57***
White 0.92 0.27 0.90 0.31 0.02***
Income 84590.25 19888.64 79300.06 22646.37 5290.19***
Female 0.60 0.49 0.61 0.49 -0.02
Observations 9666 4868 14534
Musculoskeletal procedures
Out-of-pocket cost 352.18 200.61 601.95 396.78 -249.78***
Distance 11.39 6.36 10.02 6.52 1.36***
Charlson index 0.04 0.26 0.47 0.95 -0.43***
Age 70.74 7.73 70.28 10.62 0.47
White 0.92 0.27 0.90 0.30 0.02*
Income 85495.39 18037.32 81252.39 21030.94 4243.00***
Female 0.59 0.49 0.61 0.49 -0.01
Observations 1101 3191 4292
Notes: Summary statistics are obtained from all Medicare patients who underwent gastroenterology,
ophthalmology and musculoskeletal procedure in Pennsylvania from 2012 to 2015.
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Medigap, etc. Medicare claim data alone does not identify who has and who has no supplemental
insurance. In order to recover the true price responsiveness of patients who do pay out-of-pocket
payments, it is important to weight patients with and without supplemental coinsurance properly. In
order to do so, I utilize the Medicare Current Beneciary Survey (MCBS) to estimate the regression
that reect Medicare's selection into supplemental insurances. The regression results is included in
Appendix 3.7.1. I also simulate draws of patients' characteristics from this data to predict probability
of patients having supplemental insurance. These probability will be used for the demand estimation.
More details will be provided in Subsection (3.4.1).
3.3.2 Data for cost estimation
I estimate the cost functions for ASCs and HOPDs in order to derive marginal costs of outpatient
procedures performed at these two settings. The cost function estimation utilize several data sources.
First, I use the Financial Analysis reports for ASCs in Pennsylvania, and the Medicare cost
reports for hospitals. The Financial Analysis reports include net patient revenue, total operating
margin, and most importantly total operating cost for each ASCs. The Medicare cost reports
include information that allows me to extract hospital outpatient operating costs from hospital's
total operating costs. The cost analysis is done on the facilities in Pennsylvania because Pennsylvania
is the only state that collects and publishes total operating expenses for ASCs7.
Second, I use the Hospital and Ambulatory Surgery Centers reports (2010-2017) from the Penn-
sylvania Department of Health Services' website8. The ASC reports include the outpatient operation
volume for ambulatory surgery centers, the number of operating beds, indicators for amenities such
as pharmacy, inhalation therapy, ultrasound, Xray, and specialties. The HOPDs reports include
type of organization for hospitals, number of beds, number of CT scanners, X-ray, and MRI unit.
Additionally, I use the Medicare Wage Index to control for variations in labor costs across dierent
urban and rural areas. Note that with the Medicare Wage Index, the variations in the labor costs
only come from variations in dierent locations of facilities. Plausible dierences in labor wages
between ASCs and HOPDs are not captured in the data and the cost function estimation.
As shown later in the demand estimation, patients sort into dierent facility types by patient
health risk. Therefore, patient health risk is likely an important characteristic that determines the
marginal costs at ASCs and HOPDs. The publicly available Financial Analysis reports and the ASCs
7Medicare cost reports include variable for inpatient charge and outpatient charge. Theys also include cost-to-
charge ratio. The outpatient costs is cost-to-charge multiplied with outpatient charge.
8http://www.phc4.org/default.htm
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Table 3.2: Summary of facilities in Pennsylvania, 2015
ASC HOPD
Mean Std Mean Std
Operating Cost (thousand $) 3460.94 3433.39 121076.17 110938.27
No. Outpatient Surgery 3634.69 2704.15 7419.39 6282.44
Medicare wage index 0.94 0.10 0.92 0.11
No. Beds 10.60 10.78 264.47 224.15
Clinical lab 0.09 0.29
Cardio lab 0.01 0.11
Pharmacy 0.05 0.22
Inhalation therapy 0.06 0.24
Ultrasound 0.09 0.28
Xray 0.11 0.32
No. CT scanners 2.84 2.24
No. MRI units 2.24 1.87





Note: Clinical lab, Cardio lab, Inhalation therapy, Ultrasound, Xray are the dummy variables that indicate
whether facilities have these amenities. Ophthalmology, gastroenterology, musculoskeletal are the dummy
variables that indicate whether facilities provide these services. The statistics are obtained from year 2015,
although the cost function analysis is performed on the data from 2010 to 2017.
and HOPDs reports do not have this variable. I proxy for this measure by the average Charlson
index of Medicare patients at each facility.
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of 254 ASCs and 129 HOPDs available in the data set for
the year 2015. While HOPDs perform about twice as many outpatient surgeries as ASCs, HOPDs'
total operating costs are much higher than ASCs'. HOPDs and ASCs have similar wage indices. If
anything, ASCs have slightly higher average wage index than HOPDs, which might be explained
by the observations that ASCs tend to be located in urban areas. Comparing the capital level and
the infrastructure we see stark dierences between HOPDs and ASCs. HOPDs are also equipped
with many more operating beds than ASCs. The average number of CT scanners at a hospital
is around 2.84 and the average number of MRI units is around 2.24 per hospital. In contrast, it
is very uncommon to have such infrastructures as pharmacies, Xray machines or CT scanners in
ASCs. Finally, unlike HOPDs, many ASCs are single specialty facilities, with gastroenterology and
ophthalmology the most popular specialties.
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3.4 Demand estimation strategy and results
3.4.1 Demand estimation
I specify the patients' demand for an outpatient facilities with a nested logit model. Patient
preferences depend on the OOP, distances, patient characteristics and facility types. Interactions
between patient characteristics and facility type are included to allow coecients to vary over the
population along observable patient characteristic dimensions. For example, sicker patients may
prefer HOPDs since they have emergency rooms, while healthier patients may be more willing to
visits ASCs. The nested logit structure allows for the correlation between the preferences for facilities
within the same type.
As mentioned previously, many Medicare recipients pay either zero or little out-of-pocket costs be-
cause they are covered by supplemental insurances. In order to recover the true price responsiveness
of patients who do pay out-of-pocket payments, I weight patients' utilities by the probability that
they have supplemental insurance (SI). I compute these probabilities using patients' characteristics
which are simulated from the Medicare Current Beneciary Survey and the estimated regression
that explains the enrollment into SI of Medicare beneciaries. Using these predicted probabilities
to weight utility functions, I estimate the demand parameters using simulated maximum likelihood
estimation.
Formally, let i denote patient, g denote facility group, g ∈ {A,H}, and j denote a facility in each
group. I specify two utility functions, one for patients who do not have supplemental coinsurance,
and one for patients who do have supplemental coinsurance:
uijg|No SI = −λOOPijg + αjg +Xijgdgβ + (1− σ) εijg = Vijg|SI + (1− σ) εijg (3.12)
uijg|SI = αig +Xijgdgβ + (1− σ) εijg = Vijg|SI + (1− σ) εijg (3.13)
where OOPijg is the out-of-pocket payment
9, αjg is facility jg's xed-eect, and dg is facility g's
xed-eect. Xijg is a set of patient's characteristics, such as log(incomei), agei, genderi, racei, and
distanceijg. σ is the dissimilarity parameter that indicates the correlation in patients' preferences for
facilities within the same facility group. For patients with no supplemental insurance, out-of-pocket
payment contributes to the facility choice. For patients with supplemental insurance, they pay either
zero or a small out-of-pocket payments, therefore OOP does not appear in their utility function.
9Note that OOPijg enters linearly into the utility model and incomei enter into the utility model as log(income).
This specication assumes that patients are closed to risk-neutrality. Given that the median income household is
around $ 80,000, while the average out-of-pocket payment is around $300, this assumption is defendable.
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Given these utility functions, the choice probability conditional on supplemental insurance status is
given by












Pr (i chooses facility jg|i has No SI) =
exp
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Vijg|No SI/ (1− σ)
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. The
probability of patient i choosing facility jg is
Pr (i chooses facility jg) = Pr (i chooses facility jg|i has SI)·Pr (i has SI)
+ Pr (i chooses facility jg|i has No SI)·Pr (i has No SI)







i , and drinking
s
i . Combining these simulated variables with the pa-
tient characteristics (agei, femalei, incomei, racei) in the Medicare claim data, and the SI selection
regression result, I predict the probability that patient i has supplemental insurance is:
P̂rs (i has SI) = β̂0 + β̂ZZ
s
i + β̂ageagei + β̂femalefemalei + β̂incincomei + β̂raceracei
The likelihood function is given by:
L = ΠNi=1Πg={A,H}Πj∈g Pr (i chooses facility jg)
≈ 1
S
ΠNi=1Πg={A,H}Πj∈g[Pr (i chooses facility jg|i has SI)·P̂rs (i has SI) +
Pr (i chooses facility jg|i has No SI)·P̂rs (i has No SI)] (3.14)
Some discussions about the demand estimation are warranted. First, the reader can think about
the demand problem in the following way: after being recommended by their physician to have
outpatient surgery, and perhaps to use a particular facility, patients make a two-part decision. They
decide whether to have surgery, and then they decide where to have the procedure performed. The
paper focuses on the second part of the decision: conditional on needing to undergo an outpatient
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procedure, which facility does the consumer choose? In particular, I look at how the bundle of
facility characteristics and patient characteristics impacts consumer's care setting choices.
Second, the fact that physicians make recommendations to their patients about surgery location
implies that patients are not making facility choice decisions in isolation. Therefore, utility can be
thought of as some weighted mix of patient utility and physician utility. One might include xed
eects for referring physicians in order to separate patients' preferences from physicians' inuences
in the observed choice data. Unfortunately, due to limited information on referring physicians in
the Medicare claim data set, this paper can not address this concern. However, the signicant
estimates of the λ coecient on out-of-pocket payments across all procedure groups suggest that
facility choice is sensitive to out-of-pocket payments. Therefore reimbursement and coinsurance
policies are important and impactful policy instruments.
Third, there is also a concern that the demand for one facility type might reect not only patients'
preference but also the supply of facilities of that type around the patient's location. However, this
is likely a small issue because the demand functions estimated for Pennsylvania's urban areas, where
ASCs are as prevalent as HOPDs.
3.4.2 Demand estimation results
Recall, in modeling demand as a discrete choice problem, the objective is to estimate the coecients
θ = [λ, αjg, βg, σ] from equations (3.12) and (3.13) by maximizing the simulated likelihood function
given in equation (3.14). Estimates from the nested logit demand model provide insight into
consumers' facility choice decisions. Table 3 displays the estimation results from the nested logit
demand for each procedure group.
Demand estimates show that travel distance is a signicant predictor of demand across all
procedure groups. For example, for a patient undergoing a musculoskeletal procedure, an increase
of travel distance by 1 mile has the same impact on demand as a price increase of $24.3. This result
echoes repeated ndings in the healthcare literature (see David and Neuman (2011); Capps et al.
(2010); Weber (2014); Gaynor and Vogt (2003)) that distance matters to healthcare consumers.
Turning to the interactions between patient characteristics and the HOPD dummy variable, I
nd that higher Charlson index patients, i.e., patients with higher health risks, are less likely to visit
ASC's. This result reects the dierence in Charlson index among ASCs' and HOPDs' patients seen
in the summary statistics.
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Distance -0.224∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗
(-16.41) (-19.37) (-6.57)
Out-of-pocket -0.003∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(-5.64) (-9.35) (-4.85)
Log(Income)*HOPD -0.086 0.055 -0.075
(-0.60) (0.32) (-0.20)
Charlson Index * HOPD 1.500∗∗∗ 2.788∗∗∗ 2.314∗∗∗
(17.77) (11.91) (6.30)
Age * HOPD -0.003 0.011 -0.007
(-1.05) (1.95) (-0.76)
White * HOPD -0.111 -0.143 0.055
(-0.96) (-0.86) (0.17)
Female * HOPD -0.094 0.194∗ 0.045
(-1.32) (2.01) (0.26)
Dissimilarity parameter 0.977∗∗∗ 0.901∗∗∗ 0.856∗∗∗
(15.55) (17.63) (6.22)
Number of cases 18,740 13,628 3,224
Number of facilities 89 63 64
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Finally, among patients without supplemental insurance, consumers' facility choice is sensitive
to variations in out-of-pocket payments. For example, for a patient having a gastroenterology
procedure, an increase in the out-of-pocket payment by 10 dollars decreases patients' utility by
the same amount as traveling an extra 1.4 miles. For more complicated procedures such as those in
the musculoskeletal group, the same increase in the out-of-pocket payment only decreases utility by
the same amount as traveling an extra 1.04 miles for the treatment.
The variations in out-of-pocket payments that identify the OOP coecient comes from several
sources. First, unlike the Medicare inpatient market where small price variations justify the existing
papers to drop the OOP variable from the demand estimation, the reimbursement rates that
Medicare sets outpatient procedures vary signicantly across ASCs and HOPDs. Second, even
facilities within the same type have variable reimbursement rates if they are based in locations with
dierent labor wages. Third, variations in the OOP also come from the variations in the number of
auxiliary procedures that each facility performs.
Figure 3.1 summarizes patients' valuation of care at HOPDs and ASCs. The x-axis is the
Charlson index reecting patients' health risk, and the y-axis is the patients' valuation of care. Each
red dot represents a patient's valuation of care at all ASCs available in his choice set. Each blue dot
represents the patient valuation of care at all HOPDs in his choice set. The gures make it clear
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that, across all procedure groups, patients with low Charlson indices have higher valuation for ASCs
than for HOPDs. However, patients with higher Charlson indices have signicantly higher valuation
of HOPDs than ASCs.






















































Notes: Patients' benets are calculated as α̂jg +Xijgβ̂g. The dots are the average of patients' benets
from all facilities available in patients' choice set. The intervals graphed are the 95% condence interval
of the estimated patients' benets.
3.5 Cost function estimation and results
3.5.1 Cost function estimation
The computation of optimal reimbursement rates and coinsurance rates, and their welfare impacts
require some knowledge of marginal costs of outpatient procedures at ASCs and HOPDs. The lack
of cost data at a procedure level does not allow the direct estimation of marginal cost functions.
Therefore, I estimate cost functions using total operating costs of ACSs and HOPDs and then derive
marginal costs of procedures at these two care settings.
The estimation strategy for the ASCs and HOPDs cost functions build on the literature of
short-run cost function estimation. The cost function is given as CV = G (Y,W,K) where Y is
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a vector of output, W variable input prices, and K xed capital inputs. The main behavioral
assumption is that facilities minimize variable costs by choosing variable labor input given the
capital stock, exogenous labor wage index and patients' demands for facility services.
I utilize the trans-log cost function because it imposes few a priori restrictions on the underlying
nature of products and is consistent with the functional properties required by economic theory. In
addition, the trans-log functional form has been shown to provide a reasonable approximation for
a production technology when no explicit production or cost function is specied (Guilkey et al.,
1983; Stern, 1994). The regression for ASCs' and HOPDs' cost functions are given by
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where Cht is the total operating cost of facility h at time t, Yht is total number of outpatient surgeries
performed, Qh is the facility xed eect which is interpreted as facility quality, Wht is the Medicare
Wage index, Kht is xed assets measured by the number of operating beds, Zht is a set of additional
determinants of cost such as average patient severity, specialty, facility type, and facility's amenities.
I estimate the cost functions for ASCs and HOPDs given in equation (3.15) using the xed eects
regression approach. In additional, because the cost function have many interaction terms while the
panel data has just over 2000 observations for ASCs cost function estimation and 1000 observations
for HOPD cost function estimation, I employ the Lasso estimation approach to select appropriate
control variables.
A salient issue concerning the econometric specication is the endogeneity of the output variable,
i.e., the number of surgeries. The xed eects purge facility-specic xed factors out of the error
term, but endogeneity could still result due to remaining time-varying factors. In future work,
following Gaynor and Anderson (1995), I plan to utilize county level socioeconomic and demographic
variables to instrument for the number of surgeries and its interaction terms. These variables include
the number of physicians per capita in the county, county population, county employment rate,
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county per capita income, the proportion of population in the county with any private insurance
coverage, the number of Medicare beneciaries, the percentage of population which is non-white,
younger than 15, and older than 65. The exogeneity assumption is that these variables aect the
total operating cost through no channels other than the facility demand.
Given the cost function estimates in equation (3.15), the marginal cost of a surgery at a facility















To facilitate the comparison of the marginal cost of surgeries at HOPDs and ASCs, I will evaluate
the derivative above at the average characteristics of all HOPDs and all ASCs, respectively.
3.5.2 Cost function results
Table 4 shows the estimation results of the ASCs' cost function and the HOPDs' cost function. Here
I only report the coecient estimates for the number of surgeries variable and for the interaction
between this variable and the remaining variables. The reason is that these estimates enter into the
calculation of the marginal cost of ASCs and HOPDs (as described in equation (3.16)).
The main drivers of marginal costs at ASCs are the number of surgeries and the number of beds.
In addition, ASCs' amenities such as clinical labs and ultrasounds also increase their marginal costs.
The regression estimates also suggest that specialty matters in explaining variations in marginal costs
at ASCs. For example, facilities that provide services in gastroenterology and dentistry services have
lower costs than facilities that provide other services.
For HOPDs, labor cost, teaching status, for-prot status, and the number of beds are the most
important factors that explain the marginal costs. Hospitals with more beds, located in high labor
wage areas, and with for-prot status tend to have higher marginal costs. Hospitals that have
teaching status tend to have lower marginal costs.
From the ASCs' and HOPDs' cost function regressions, I derive the average marginal cost over
all procedures provided at ASCs and HOPDs according to equation (3.16) and evaluate them at
the mean of HOPDs and ASCs characteristics. I also calculate the average marginal cost of each
procedure group provided at ASCs and HOPDs. I assume that the estimated average marginal
cost is the weighted average of the marginal cost of all procedure groups, with the weights being
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Table 3.4: Estimation results of ASCs and HOPDs cost functions
ASC HOPD
ln(Operating Cost) ln(Operating Cost)
No.Surgery 0.874∗∗∗ (3.38) -0.182 (-0.57)
No.Surgery Squared -0.0280∗ (-2.09) 0.0130 (0.59)
No.Surgery * No. Bed 0.0453∗∗ (3.12) 0.123∗ (2.14)
No.Surgery * Wage index 0.167 (0.96) 0.295∗∗∗ (4.45)
No.Surgery * Severity 0.180 (1.54) 0.205 (1.43)
No.Surgery * Cardio Lab -0.00455 (-0.01)
No.Surgery * Electro Cardio -0.0282 (-0.76)
No.Surgery * Pharmacy 0.0726 (0.83)
No.Surgery * Clinical Lab 0.0789∗ (1.96)
No.Surgery * Inhalation Therapy 0.0219 (0.46)
No.Surgery * Ultrasound -0.137∗ (-2.29)
No.Surgery * X-ray -0.0412 (-1.17)
No.Surgery * Gastroenterology -0.0148∗∗ (-3.20)
No.Surgery * Musculoskeletal 0.0615 (1.29)
No.Surgery * Dentistry -0.0753∗∗∗ (-3.55)
No.Surgery * Urology 0.0467 (0.94)
No.Surgery * OB/GYN -0.0722 (-1.64)
No.Surgery * Plastic 0.0145 (0.38)
No.Surgery * Ophthalmology -0.0352 (-0.97)
No.Surgery * Teaching -0.173∗∗ (-2.98)
No.Surgery * For Prot 0.0534∗∗ (3.04)
No.Surgery * No.CT scanners -0.0283 (-1.79)
No.Surgery * No.MRI units -0.00410 (-0.27)
N 2284 1013
No.Variables of interest 318 228
No.Controls 161 20
No. Controls selected 105 19
Chi-square 58060.1 599467.4
p-value 0 0
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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the procedure group volumes. I also assume that the Ambulatory Procedure Classication (APC)
weights, which Medicare uses to rank the resource intensity for procedures, reect the true relative
magnitude of their marginal costs. These two assumptions give the system of equations that allow
me to calculate the procedure group marginal cost:
AvgMCASC =















Table 3.5: Estimated marginal costs by facility type and by procedure group
Average MC (Std. error) APC weight No.of cases MC Medicare
payment
ASCs
Musculoskeletal 388.04 (27.43) 12.30 23,313 242.08 519.11
Ophthalmology 388.04 (27.43) 18.06 23,891 355.41 751.05
Musculoskeletal 388.04 (27.43) 29.15 22,524 573.70 1210.01
HOPDs
Musculoskeletal 695.49 (23.64) 17.09 36,690 499.87 1161.97
Ophthalmology 695.49 (23.64) 20.16 15,044 589.76 1439.93
Musculoskeletal 695.49 (23.64) 30.95 41,784 905.32 2121.01
Table 5 reports the estimated average marginal costs and the estimated marginal costs of each
procedure groups at ASCs and HOPDs. There is a signicant dierence between the estimated
ASCs' and HOPDs' average marginal costs. The average marginal cost of a surgery at ASCs is
$388.04 whereas the average marginal cost of a surgery at HOPD is $695.49. At the procedure
group level, musculoskeletal procedures have the highest APC weight, and therefore are the most
costly procedure group, followed by ophthalmology and gastroenterology. The marginal cost of these
procedure groups at HOPDs are much higher than the marginal costs at ASCs. Notably, both of
these marginal costs are much lower than the current average Medicare reimbursement rates.
As mentioned previously, due to the lack of ASC cost data, estimates of ASCs' marginal cost
is nearly non-existent elsewhere in literature. The only study that attempts to compare HOPDs'
and ASCs' cost is Wynn et al. (2008). Using cost reports of hospitals in California, they calculate
hospital cost per APC weight unit. They also calculate the same measure for a set of ambulatory
surgery centers in California using ASCs' procedure data and their nancial reports. Consistent
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with my estimates, they nd that the estimated ASCs' costs are much lower (about 66% to 71%)
than the estimated HOPD costs.
The calculation of the marginal costs of each procedure group at HOPDs and ASCs assumes
that Medicare's APC weights for procedure groups reect the true relative magnitude of procedure
groups' marginal costs. In order to test this assumption, I use an additional data set on ambulatory
procedures at ASCs and HOPDs10 to estimate the same regression in equation (3.15) for each
procedure group. Since ASCs often provide a small number of specialties, the data has enough
power to detect the variations in total operating costs that are attributed to the variations in
each procedure group's volume. Therefore, it is possible to estimate the marginal cost of each
procedure group provided in ASCs. In contrast, HOPDs provide multiple procedure groups, the
data, therefore, does not have enough power to detect the contribution of each procedure group to
total operating costs. Therefore, the estimation of HOPDs' marginal costs at the procedure group
level is noisy. Given ASCs' marginal cost estimates at the procedure group level, I compare the
normalized APC weights that Medicare assigns for each group with the normalized marginal cost
estimates. The normalization is with respect to the APC weight and the estimated marginal cost of
the gastroenterology procedure group. I nd that the normalized Medicare APC weights reects the
normalized marginal cost reasonably well. Estimation results for marginal costs of procedure groups
at ASCs and the comparison between the APC weights and ASCs' marginal costs are detailed in
Appendix 3.7.3.
3.5.3 ASCs' and HOPDs' value - cost dierence
Combining the patients' valuation and the marginal cost of ASCs and HOPDs, I calculate the net
value of HOPDs and ASCs and graph them in Figure 3.2. The left gure represents the average
of the value - cost dierence of ASCs and HOPDs for gastroenterology procedures, while the right
gure represents the same measure for musculoskeletal procedures. The facilities are indexed by
Facility ID. ASCs' values are represented in red dots and HOPD's values are represented in blue
dots. As seen clearly in the left hand side gure, ASCs oer a signicantly higher net value than
HOPDs for gastroenterology patients. This is because, given that most gastroenterology patients
are low risk, the average patients' valuation of ASCs is not very dierent from those of HOPDs.
However, the marginal cost estimation shows that HOPDs' average marginal cost is signicantly
higher than ASCs' average marginal cost. In contrast, in the right hand side gure, there is no
10This additional dataset is the Ambulatory Procedure data from Health Cost containment Council
http://www.phc4.org/
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Notes: Value to cost dierences are dened by α̂jg +Xijgβ̂g − M̂Cg
evidence that ASCs' net value is dierent from HOPDs' net value for musculoskeletal procedures.
For this procedure group, patients have relatively higher health risks, the higher cost at HOPDs is
generally oset by the higher value of care that they provide.
The dierences in net value of ASCs and HOPDs have direct implications for the optimal
allocations of patients across facility types. For gastroenterology procedures, since patients have
higher net value at ASCs, it is optimal for reimbursement rates to incentivize more patients to
undertake treatments at ASCs. This allocation is achieved if Medicare increases HOPDs' coinsurance
rate while decreasing ASCs' coinsurance rate. In the case where coinsurance rates are xed uniformly
across care settings, the price variation between HOPDs and ASCs will have to be large in order
to incentivize more patients to sort into ASCs. For musculoskeletal procedures, the allocation of
patients between ASCs and HOPDs might be more even since the dierence in net value between
ASCs and HOPDs is not signicant. As a result, the optimal variation in reimbursement rates
and coinsurance rates for musculoskeletal procedures does not need to be as large as those for
gastroenterology procedures.
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The following section combines the demand and cost estimation results to examine empirically
what the allocation of patients into ASCs and HOPDs should look like and what the optimal payment
scheme and coinsurance rates are to achieve that allocation.
3.6 Counterfactual Analysis
3.6.1 The welfare impacts of Medicare's site neutral payment policy
In this section, I use the demand and marginal cost estimates to examine the welfare impacts of a
site-neutral payment policy. It is a simplied version of the recent legislations that the Center of
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) implemented to close the gap in reimbursement rates for
HOPDs and ASCs and lower costs for common services under the outpatient care payment system.
For example, in 2017, Medicare ruled that o-campus provider-based sites located 250 yards or more
away from the hospital's campus will receive the same reimbursement rates as ASCs' reimbursement
rates. In 2019, CMS began to pay HOPDs the same rates as ASCs for outpatient clinical visits 11.
In this section, I predict the welfare impacts of the counterfactual scenario where Medicare reduces
the HOPDs' reimbursement rate to the current ASCs' rates for gastroenterology, ophthalmology and
musculoskeletal procedures.
In order to measure the welfare impacts of this policy, I rst calculate the new out-of-pocket
payments that resulted from this policy change. I obtain the national unadjusted reimbursement
rates to HOPDs and ASCs for all outpatient procedure codes from the CMS' website. I then follow
CMS's formula to adjust 60% of the HOPD reimbursement rates and 50% of the ASC reimbursement
rates by the Medicare wage index. In doing so, I obtain HOPD and ASC reimbursement rates for all
outpatient procedures in all facilities in the sample. I also obtain the counterfactual reimbursement
rates if HOPDs are reimbursed at ASCs' rates. Recall that in constructing the out-of-pocket
payments for the demand estimation, I include not only the facility fees but also the auxiliary
procedure fees. The counterfactual out-of-pocket payments will only have the reimbursement rates
of the main procedures changed, while the auxiliary procedure fees are assumed xed. I also assume
that the site-neutral payment policy does not change the frequency at which the auxiliary proce-
dures are provided. Using demand estimates, the marginal cost estimates and the counterfactual
out-of-pocket payments, I simulate counterfactual market shares, premium, consumer surplus, care
provider surplus and total surplus.
11https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/nance/12-things-to-know-about-site-neutral-payments.html
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Table 3.6: Wefare impacts of the site-neural payment policy
Gastroenterology Ophthalmology Musculoskeletal
ASC HOPD ASC HOPD ASC HOPD
Out-of-pocket payment
Before site-neutral 119.375 193.876 189.623 318.810 326.642 542.204
After site-neutral 119.375 119.553 189.623 187.637 326.642 325.982
Market share
Before site-neutral .777 .222 .574 .425 .503 .496
After site-neutral .749 .250 .364 .635 .264 .735
Premium Change ($) ( %) ($) ( %) ($) ( %)
Premium -15548.24 -12.115 -35789.08 -21.491 -16046.45 -23.647
Surpluses change ($) ( %) ($) ( %) ($) ( %)
Consumer surplus 41710.5 1.234 254200.4 15.705 87073.13 6.223
Procedure surplus -427231.1 -12.645 -1086124 -67.104 -473093.1 -33.813
Total surplus -3727.781 -1.695 -5807.117 -4.433 -3254.555 -6.258
The results are reported in Table 6. The site-neutral payment equalizes the reimbursement
rates for HOPDs and ASCs and closes the gaps between the out-of-pocket payments that ASC and
HOPD patients pay. For example, gastroenterology patients pay out of pocket approximately $195
at HOPDs and $119 at ASCs before the site-neutral payment policy. Under this policy, the out-of-
pocket payments at HOPDs are reduced to the out-of-pocket payment level at ASCs. As expected,
the site-neutral payment policy encourages more patients to undergo treatment at hospitals. Given
that coinsurance rates stay the same, the lower HOPD reimbursement rates lead to a decrease in the
premium by 12% to 24% across procedures. Since government funds subsidize Medicare beneciaries
75% of the premium, this means that government spending on the Medicare also falls by 12% to
24%.
Consumer surplus increases because more patients can now enjoy higher value hospital care but
pay roughly the same amount as they would in ASCs. However, providers' prot decreases due
to ASCs having fewer patients and HOPD earning less for each patients they treat. Summing the
changes in consumer surplus, provider surplus and premium, the estimates suggest that the site
neutral payment policy results in a decrease in total surplus for all procedure groups. Intuitively,
the negative change in the total surplus is due to the fact that more patients are encouraged to use
care at HOPDs while ASCs provide higher or equal net value for all procedure groups.
The magnitude of the decrease in the total surplus varies across procedure groups. Gastroenterol-
ogy and ophthalmology procedures exhibit smaller decreases in total surplus. This is due to variations
across procedure groups in the demand responsiveness and the magnitude of the out-of-pocket
payment changes resulting from the site-neutral payment policy.
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3.6.2 Optimal reimbursement rates when the coinsurance rates are set
exogenously
The previous section shows that while the site-neutral payment reduces Medicare spending on the
outpatient care market, it leads to allocative ineciency, and in sum, reduces total surplus. In this
section, I examine what the reimbursement rates should be in order to maximize social surplus if the
coinsurance rates must be maintained at the current 20% level. I also compute the welfare impacts if
Medicare were to move from the current practice to this constrained optimal reimbursement scheme.
The optimal reimbursement rate structure is essentially a pair of HOPD and ASC payment
rates, which are nationally adjusted by the Medicare wage index to obtain the payment scheme for
all HOPDs and ASCs given their geographical locations. This optimal payment scheme induces the
patient choices that maximize the total surplus. Recall that the total surplus is decreasing in the
out-of-pocket payments. Therefore, optimally, at least one reimbursement rate has to be set at the
marginal cost of the providers. Also recall from subsection 3.2 that, if the coinsurance rates are set
at an exogenous rate, at least one type of facilities is reimbursed above their marginal cost. The
previous analysis also suggests that ASCs provide higher or equal net value relative to HOPDs for
all procedure groups. Thus, the optimal allocation of patients would have more patients going to
ASCs. Intuitively, ASCs are optimally reimbursed at their marginal costs, and HOPDs are optimally
reimbursed higher than their marginal cost to induce patients to sort into ASCs. To compute the
optimal reimbursement rates, I search for the HOPD markup that gives rise to the reimbursement
scheme which maximizes the social surplus.
Table 7 reports for each procedure group the optimal markups, the optimal reimbursement rates
for ASCs and HOPDs, the resulting market shares, the changes in premiums, consumer surplus and
procedure surplus, and total surplus changes if Medicare moves from the current practice to this
optimal payment structure.
The current reimbursement policy implies that ASCs and HOPDs receive markups about 1.7 to
2.1 times their marginal costs. A grid search of the optimal markups suggests that ASCs should
be paid their marginal costs, and HOPDs should have higher markups than those implied by the
current payment scheme. For example, for the gastroenterology procedure group, HOPDs should be
reimbursed 7 times higher than their marginal cost. This implies that at the optimum, the payment
dierentials between ASCs and HOPDs should be even larger than the existing ones. This result
suggests that given the 20% coinsurance rate, the current payment dierentials are not enough to
deter patients from going to high cost HOPDs.
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Table 3.7: The optimal reimbursement rate given the 20% coinsurance rate and the welfare impacts
Gastroenterology Ophthalmology Musculoskeletal
ASC HOPD ASC HOPD ASC HOPD
Estimated marginal costs
Marginal cost 287 581 421 686 680 1053
Markups
Status quo 1.80 1.99 1.78 2.09 1.77 2.01
Optimal 1 7 1 4 1 3.25
Reimbursement rates
Status quo 519.11 1161.97 751.04 1439.93 1210.01 2121.01
Optimal 352.00 4877.99 461.66 2993.19 888.78 4432.59
Market shares
Status quo .77 .22 .57 .42 .50 .49
Optimal .93 .06 .90 .09 .68 .31
Premium Change ($) ( %) ($) ( %) ($) ( %)
Premium -53207.75 -10.36 -282914.5 -15.47 -12628.94 -8.98
Surpluses change ($) ( %) ($) ( %) ($) ( %)
Consumer surplus 499840 3.69 710577.5 10.97 -22563 -.40
Provider surplus -431570.5 -6.96 -5873453 -63.03 -101824.3 -2.55
Total surplus 56621.25 6.43 24770.75 4.72 6409.56 3.08
Under the proposed optimal reimbursement rates, most patients in the gastroenterology and
ophthalmology groups choose ASCs and more patients in the musculoskeletal procedure group
also substitute away from HOPDs to ASCs. Premiums are decreased by 9% to 13% under these
optimal reimbursement rates. Because HOPD reimbursement rates are increased, more, if not
most patients, receive care at lower-cost ASCs. Consumer surplus increases for gastroenterology
and ophthalmology procedures but decreases for musculoskeletal procedures. Procedure surplus
decreases for all procedure groups despite HOPD reimbursement rates increasing, because ASCs are
reimbursed less for each patient and more patients are treated at ASCs under the proposed policy.
Summing the impacts on the premium, consumer surplus, and facility surplus, the result suggests
that increasing the variations in the HOPD and ASC payment rates increases the social welfare by
3.1% to 6.4%.
It is also notable that the optimal HOPD markup is much higher for the gastroenterology
procedure group than for the musculoskeletal procedure group. This result is consistent with the
net value provided by ASCs and HOPDs to gastroenterology and musculoskeletal patients. ASCs
on average provide higher net value than HOPDs for gastroenterology patients. Therefore, HOPDs'
reimbursement rates have to be signicantly higher than ASCs' reimbursement in order to encourage
patients to switch to ASCs. For musculoskeletal procedures, HOPDs on average provide equal net
value as ASCs. Therefore the optimal HOPDs reimbursement rates need not to have a very high
markup.
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Table 3.8: The optimal reimbursement rates and the coinsurance rates and the welfare impacts
Gastroenterology Ophthalmology Musculoskeletal
ASC HOPD ASC HOPD ASC HOPD
Estimated marginal costs
Marginal cost 287 581 421 686 680 1053
Optimal reimbursement rates
Reimbursement rate 287 581 421 686 680 1053
Coinsurance rates
Status quo .20 .20 .20 .20 .20 .20
Coinsurance rates .05 .95 .15 .75 .6 .9
Market shares
Status quo .77 .22 .57 .42 .50 .49
Optimal .91 .08 .89 .10 .67 .32
Premium Change ($) ( %) ($) ( %) ($) ( %)
Premium -221939 -15.46 -410799.3 -20.25 -226025 -23.49
Surpluses change ($) ( %) ($) ( %) ($) ( %)
Consumer surplus 1527146 11.30 1030760 15.92 -1142101 -20.40
Provider surplus -4896967 -79.06 -8750890 -93.91 -3250028 -81.40
Total surplus 53447.94 6.07 24792.75 4.73 6418.547 3.08
To summarize, instead of equalizing the reimbursement rates as in the site-neutral policy, Medi-
care can improve total welfare by widening the ASC - HOPD reimbursement gap even more in order
to ensure more people sort into high net value ASCs.
3.6.3 Optimal reimbursement rates and coinsurance rates and the welfare
impacts
In this subsection, I examine what the optimal reimbursement rates and coinsurance rates are if
Medicare can set the coinsurance rates exibly. I also compute the welfare impacts if Medicare were
to move from the current practice to the optimal reimbursement and coinsurance rate scheme.
In Subsection 3.2 I show that when Medicare is able to set coinsurance rates exibly, the optimal
policy is to reimburse HOPDs and ASCs at their marginal cost levels and to allow the coinsurance
rates to steer patients to the higher net value setting. To compute the optimal coinsurance rates,
I search over a grid of coinsurance values from 0.05 to 0.95 for the pair of coinsurance rates for
HOPDs and ASCs, which, together with the optimal reimbursement rates, induces patients' choice
that maximize total surplus. The values 0 and 1 are excluded from the grid search because in reality
some patients are risk averse, and thus the optimal coinsurance rates cannot be a corner solution.
Table 8 reports for each procedure group the optimal reimbursement rates, the optimal coinsurance
rates, the resulting market shares, the change in premium, consumer surplus, provider surplus and
total surplus when Medicare were to move to the optimal payment structures.
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Table 3.9: Welfare impacts of varying the coinsurance rates for HOPDs and ASCs
Gastroenterology Ophthalmology Musculoskeletal
ASC HOPD ASC HOPD ASC HOPD
Reimbursement rates
Status quo 519.11 1161.97 751.04 1439.93 1210.01 2121.01
Optimal 287 581 421 686 680 1053
Coinsurance rates
Status quo .2 .2 .2 . 2 .2 .2
Optimal .05 .2 .05 .2 .05 .2
Market shares
Status quo .77 .22 .571 .429 .50 .49
Optimal .79 .20 .574 .425 .52 .47
Premium Change ($) ( %) ($) ( %) ($) ( %)
Premium -154899.3 -30.17 -318517.1 -47.81 -118403.4 -43.62
Surpluses change ($) ( %) ($) ( %) ($) ( %)
Consumer surplus 1861227 13.77 2299053 35.51 881518.5 15.75
Provider surplus -4777000 -77.13 -8661619 -92.95 -3217682 -80.59
Total surplus 9110.688 1.03 388.75 .07 1595.25 .76
The current policy sets a uniform coinsurance of 20% for all procedures at all outpatient providers.
My calculations suggest that at optimum, the coinsurance rate for HOPDs has to be much higher
than the coinsurance rate for ASCs so that patients avoid low net value HOPDs more frequently.
Under this payment scheme, most patients choose to go to ASCs. The premium decreases signi-
cantly because the reimbursement rates for both ASCs and HOPDs decrease, and patients contribute
more to the cost of the treatments. The provider surplus also decreases signicantly because the
reimbursement rates are cut down to marginal cost levels. For gastroenterology and ophthalmology
procedures, consumer surplus increases because more patients now receive care at ASCs, where both
the treatment prices and the coinsurance rates decrease. For musculoskeletal procedures, consumer
surplus decreases because although the treatment prices decrease, the optimal coinsurance rates are
higher at both care settings. However, summing the changes in consumer surplus, premium change,
and provider surplus, the optimal policy results in an increase in total surplus by approximately
3.1% to 6.1%.
A similar amount of welfare gain is also achieved in the counterfactual analysis in Subsection
3.6.2, where the coinsurance rates are xed at 20%. The advantage of the unconstrained optimal
policy over the constrained optimal policy in Subsection 3.6.2 is that it decreases the premium even
further by about 5%. This large reduction is due to the fact that reimbursement rates are reduced
to the marginal cost levels, instead of having to be raised above the marginal cost for HOPDs to
achieve allocative eciency. As mentioned previously, the US government uses Medicare funds to
subsidize Medicare beneciaries for 75% of the premium cost. Therefore, taking into account the
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shadow cost of public funds, the unconstrained optimal policy that varies the coinsurance rates is
particularly relevant and attractive given the extra reduction in Medicare spending.
The reader might argue that the high coinsurance rates proposed in the optimal policy above
might deter patients from obtaining the treatment, and that that behaviors are not captured in the
analysis because there is no outside option. To address this concern, I compute the welfare impacts if
Medicare reduces the reimbursement rates to the marginal cost levels, keeps the HOPD coinsurance
the same, but reduces the ASC coinsurance rate in order to induce more patients to ASCs. The
results are reported in Table 9. It shows that Medicare can still achieve a positive welfare gain by
only lowering the ASC coinsurance rate, conditional on reducing the reimbursement rates for both
provider types to their marginal costs.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I study how Medicare can optimally set reimbursement rates and coinsurance rates for
the outpatient procedures that can be performed in either hospital outpatient departments (HOPDs)
or ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs).
I show that theoretically, the optimal reimbursement rates are set at providers' marginal costs
and coinsurance rates should be higher for the facility types that have lower net value. Through
empirical analysis, I show that such policy changes in Medicare's payment structure can increase
total welfare by 3% to 6% while simultaneously reducing Medicare spending by 15% to 23%. These
welfare improvements and cost savings are possible because currently both HOPDs and ASCs are
reimbursed at rates that exceed their respective marginal costs, and the uniform coinsurance rate
across care settings do not incentivize sucient sorting into ASCs, which provide comparable care
to patients with lower risks at much lower costs.
I also show that when Medicare is constrained to keep the same coinsurance rates across care set-
tings, Medicare should optimally increase the HOPD - ASC reimbursement dierential to incentivize
more patients to sort into ASCs. Compared to the scenario where Medicare is able to optimally
vary coinsurance rates, this constrained policy results in a smaller Medicare cost saving of 6% to
8%. Given that Medicare spent $333 billion on outpatient services in 201812, and facility fees make
up about 66% to 85% of the total cost of each outpatient visit 13, Medicare would forgo additional





Finally, my empirical analyses also suggest that Medicare's recent site-neutral policy, which
equalizes reimbursement rate between HOPDs and ASCs but keeps the coinsurance rates the same
at 20%, instead incentivizes greater sorting into HOPDs, resulting in a welfare loss. Overall,
my analyses advocate that Medicare should employ both reimbursement and insurance policies
simultaneously in order to improve eciency in the allocation of care and to reduce Medicare
spending.
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Appendices
3.7.1 Appendix for selection into supplemental insurance
A signicant proportion of Medicare beneciaries have supplemental insurance to cover out-of-pocket
payments. This supplemental insurance includes Medigap insurance, Medicaid, employer-sponsored
insurances, etc. However, the Medicare claim dataset does not identify supplemental insurance
enrollment status, and does not record the real out-of-pocket payment that patients face. Most of
the patients with supplemental insurance face small or zero out-of-pocket amounts. The demand
estimation has to take this fact into account in order to estimate the true responsiveness of patients to
the out-of-pocket payment. I do so by weighting the utility of patients who pay the full out-of-pocket
amount and the utility of patients who do not pay the out-of-pocket payments properly. I weight
them by the probability of having the supplemental insurance and the probability of not having the
supplemental insurance. In order to calculate this probability, I utilize the publicly available version
of the Medicare Current Beneciary Survey to obtain the information on supplemental insurance
coverage and patient's characteristics. I estimate the relationship between supplemental coinsurance
and enrollee's characteristics through a logit regression, given by
SIi = α0 + αDDi + αHHi + ei (3.21)
SIi is the dummy for whether patient i has supplemental insurance, Di is a set of demographic
characteristics such as gender, age, race, income level, location, education and marriage status, and
Hi is a set of health status variable, including self reported health status, dummy for smoking and
drinking. The estimated relationship is reported in the table 2.
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Income level 1.374∗∗∗ (10.00)
Metro location 0.197 (1.43)
Education level 0.688∗∗∗ (3.74)
Marriage status 0.285∗∗∗ (4.39)
General health status 0.219∗∗∗ (3.93)
Smoking status -0.429∗∗ (-2.88)




Notes: The regression is estimated on the publicly available version of the 2015 Medicare Current Beneciary
survey. t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The regression result suggests that income is the strongest predictor of the enrollment into
supplemental insurance. Medicare recipients with higher incomes are more likely to have supple-
mental insurance. Similarly, Medicare recipients who are older, married, have higher education are
also more likely to select themselves into supplemental insurance plans. Interestingly, patients with
supplemental insurance are more likely to have better health statuses, not to smoke and not to drink.
This relationship is inline with the Fang et al. (2008)'s ndings that patients are advantageously
selected into Medigap plans.
3.7.2 Appendix for ASC and HOPD outcomes
60-day readmission rate vary across procedure groups. For example, for patients who undergo
gastroenterology procedures, it is more likely that they will gave another outpatient visits within
a 60-day period if the rst visits are at hospital. The opposite is true for patients who have
opthalmology procedures. For patients with musculoskeletal procedures, the readmission rates are
the same between those who visit ASC rst and those who visit HOPD rst.
I also summarize the rate of which a patient has another outpatient visits at HOPDs. [I am
going to get a better estimate of hospital transfer, the rate of which a patient has another outpatient
visits at HOPDs is a misleading measure of hospital transfer ]
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Table 3.11: Readmission rate and Readmission rate to HOPDs
ASC HOPD Dierence
Mean Std Mean Std
Gastroenterology procedures
60-day readmission rate 1.033 0.23 1.052 0.34 -0.020∗∗∗
60-day readmission rate to HOPD 0.004 0.06 0.036 0.19 -0.032∗∗∗
Observations 15470 15411 30881
Ophthalmology procedures
60-day readmission rate 1.413 0.63 1.372 0.74 0.040**
60-day readmission rate to HOPD 0.003 0.05 0.031 0.46 -0.028***
Observations 10625 4360 14985
Musculoskeletal procedures
60-day readmission rate 1.022 0.15 1.020 0.14 0.002
60-day readmission rate to HOPD 0.001 0.03 0.019 0.14 -0.018***
Observations 2538 4280 6818
3.7.3 Appendix for cost estimation
Using the PHC4 data to estimate the Cost functions for individual procedure groups in ASCs. The
main estimation results are included in the table below
Figure 3.3 demonstrates a scatter plot of the normalized APC weights against the normalized
ASC marginal cost for the six most popular procedures group provided in ASCs, which are gas-
troenterology, musculoskeletal, skin related, cardio, nervous and ophthalmology procedures. The
scatter plot suggests that the normalized Medicare APC weights reects the normalized Marginal
Cost reasonably well.
Figure 3.3: Compare the ASC's APC weight and the estimated MC cost
G:/Users/yentran/Google Drive/5. Site neutral payment/Results/compare_APC_MC.eps.pdf
3.7.4 Appendix for Section: Theoretical Model
Theoretical model without the outside option
Medicare problem
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Table 3.12: ASC Cost Function from Ambulatory Procedure data set, 2015 - 2017
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gastro Musculo Skin Cardio Nervous Ophthal
Log(No.Surgeries) .210 -.077 0 0 0 -.544
Squared Log(No.Surgeries) -.002 .024∗ .019 .100 -.0166 .0217
No.Bed -.031 -.026 -.019 .277∗ .0254 -.014
Wageindex -.104 .004 .543 1.190 -.003 .821
Avg. Charlson Index .1789∗ -.018 .349 -.277 -.0180 .240
Spec_oral -.006 -.019 -.083 .152 .0267 -.067
Spec_colon .005 .073∗ .020 .431 .0472 .126∗∗∗
Spec_orthopedic -.017 -.144∗∗ -.020 -1.575 .0104 .011
Spec_thoracic .156∗∗ -.301 .076 .372 -.098 -.422
Spec_family -.151∗ .258∗∗∗ .139 .193 .060 -.385
Spec_urology .074∗ -.103∗ -.093 1.138 .0176 .047
Spec_internal medicine .011 .037 -.107∗ 1.030∗∗ -.026 .191
Spec_plastic -.020 .045 .026 -.584 -.001 -.041
Spec_ophthalmology -.012 .013 -.054 .731 -.047 -.438
Ind_Cardio Lab .071 .164 -.331 -.305 -.300 -.840∗∗∗
Ind_ Electro Cardio .037 -.045 -.013 1.200∗∗ -.038 -.163
Ind_Pharmacy -.123 .191 -.003 -2.333∗ -.167 -.229
Ind_Clinical Lab .107∗ -.074 .028 .6565 .533 1.112∗∗∗
Ind_Inhalation -.093∗∗∗ -.125 .306∗ -.6107 -.011 .129
Ind_Ultrasound -.053 .068 .056 -.212 -.01615 -1.314∗
N 409 257 310 105 296 177
Notes: Data on the number of surgeries for each procedure group is obtained from the Ambulatory Procedure






[puA(κ, r) + (1− p)u0] dF (r) +
∫ 1
rAH









φ = p {(1− bH) pH [1− F (rHA)] + (1− bA) pAF (rHA)} (3.23)
pH ≥ cH (3.24)
pA ≥ cA (3.25)
With little algebra, we can simplify the objective function to








And we can also rewrite the Medicare problem as
min−W s.t cH ≤ pH , cA ≤ pA
Lagrangian of this problem is
L = −W + λH (cH − pH) + λA (cA − pA)
FOC w.r.t pH :



































sub these into the FOC w.r.t. pH to achieve
− (1− p)φpHν′ − pF (rAH)φpHν
′
A − p (1− F (vAH)) (φpH + bH) ν
′
H = −λH
since φpH > 0, (1− vAH) > 0, φpH + bH > 0, the LHS <0 , meaning λH > 0. Thus, optimally
pH = cH
The same reasoning applies for reimbursement rate of ASCs. Essentially, since consumer sur-
plus is decreasing in ASC reimbursement rates, the optimal reimbursement rate makes the ASC's
participation constraint bind, i.e., pA = cA FOC w.r.t pA
FOC w.r.t bA:
− (1− p)φbAν′ − pφbAν
′











− (1− p)φbAν′ − pφbAν
′

































sub into the RHS of 3.26
(1− p)φbAν′ + pφbAν
′






















Similarly for bH ,






















































































Note that if u () is linear (risk-neutrality case) we have
[(1− bH) pH − (1− bA) pA] = 0
(1− bH) pH = (1− bA) pA
bH> bA because pH > pA
If u () is not linear, we still have that
(1− bH) pH − (1− bA) pA > 0






























If pH  pA and that βH ∼ βA, than 1− bH < 1− bA . i.e., if the prices dierence is large, but the
quality dierence are small then the bH > bA
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Theoretical model with outside option
With the outside option, the utilities of all alternatives are uN = ν (w − φ), uA = ν (w − φ− bApA)+
αA+βAr, and uH = ν (w − φ− bHpH)+αH +βHr. The system of demand is dened by two cut-o










[ν (w − φ)− ν (w − φ− bApA)]−
αA
βA
So we have a system of demands for A, H and N :
QN = rAN
QA = rHA − rAN
QH = 1− rHA




u (v) dF (v) = (1− p) ν (w − φ) + pβArANF (rAN ) + p (βH − βA) rAHF (rAH)
+ p [ν (w − φ− bHpH) + αH ] + βAp
∫ rHA
rAN




So rewrite the Medicare problem as
min−W s.t cH ≤ pH , cA ≤ pA
Lagrangian
L = −W + λH (cH − pH) + λA (cA − pA)
The FOCs w.r.t pH and pA in this case are similar to the FOC in the case without the outside
option. They also give the same result, which is that the optimal reimbursement rates should be at
the marginal costs, i.e., the participation constraints bind.
The FOCs w.r.t to the coinsurance rates give the similar expressions as the case without the











































φ = p [(1− bH) pH (1− rHA) + (1− bA) pA (rHA − rAN )]
From these FOCs we also have































Solving for φbA and φbH , and substituting in this equality yields












H = 1, or if patients at HOPDs and ASCs have the same risk protection












If βH/mcH > βA/mcA, βHQH/mcH < βAQA/mcA. Moreover mcH > mcA , βAQA/mcH <














1− b∗H < 1− b∗A ⇒ b∗H > b∗A
102








+ (1− bA) pA (βHQH + βAQA)


















If βH ≈ βA and that pH  pA, then 1− bH < 1− bA , i.e., bH > bA.
3.7.5 Appendix for Section : Empirical model















































































[pVijAPijA + (1− p)ViPijA] +
∑
jH




























(1− p)Vi + λA (cA − pA) + λH (cH − pH)




























To simplifying notation, I omit the subscript i in the following calculation and will add it back in


































This makes sense because increasing prices of all ASC facilities does not change the probability of
































































































= PjAPH (1− σ)λ∆ν′pA
where ∆ν′pA = ν
′
HφpA − ν′A (φpA + bA). We are left to calculate ∂PjH/pA. Recall that PjH =


























= −PAPjH (1− σ)λ∆ν′pA
with ∆ν′pA = ν
′
HφpA−ν′A (φpA + bA) < 0. Substitute the derivative of the market share with respect


















































Assume that the change in patient utility due to price change and premium change is higher than
the change in patient's utility due to demand change (because the demand response is small), then
λA > 0. Therefore, p
∗
A = cA. Similarly, λH > 0 and p
∗
H = cH



























Again I am going to omit the subscript ik and only add back in the nal expression. First I am
Recall that






















































 = −λν′A (φbA + pA)∑
jA


































= (1− σ)λPAPH [ν′HφbA − ν′A (φbA + pA)]
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= Pj|j∈A (1− σ)λPAPH [ν′HφbA − ν′A (φbA + pA)]
= PjAPH (1− σ)λ [ν′HφbA − ν′A (φbA + pA)]
= PjAPH (1− σ)λ∆ν′bA
















= −PAPjH (1− σ)λ∆ν′bA











































(1− p)λν′φbA = 0
Simplifying









































































































jH PijH . Rearrange:
− (φbA + pA) pν′AQA − φbApν′HQH − (1− p) ν′φbA = 0



















. Divide both sides with (1− p) ν′AφbA ,
and Taylor expand ν′A around ν
′, we yield the equations3.30 and 3.29, which and that reect the






































′ (w − φ− bApA) ≈ ν′ (w − φ) + ν
′′










ν′ (w − φ)
)
bApA ≈ 1 + γbApA
where γ = −ν
′′
(w−φ)
ν′ (w−φ) dened as the absolute risk aversion coecient at the wealth level w − φ.
Substituting this into the RHS of the equation above to yield the equations that reect the balance
between risk protection benet and allocation eciency.
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